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I. INTRODUCTION 
By any measure, Frank J. Kelley was an extraordinary Attorney Gen-
eral.  In his thirty-seven years in office, Mr. Kelly redefined the role of the 
state‟s chief legal officer, creating a model that has now been widely copied 
around the country.  Under his leadership, the size of the office tripled, from 
84 lawyers in 1962 to 301 attorneys when he retired in 1998.  Kelley put 
these new resources to good use, creating the country‟s first Consumer Pro-
tection  and  Environmental  Divisions  and  vigorously  prosecuting  a  wide 
range of unfair business practices and environmental harms.
1   
   
  *  Lester Kissel Professor of Law, Vice Dean for Global Initiatives on the Legal 
Profession, and Faculty Director of the Program on the Legal Profession and the Center on 
Lawyers and the Professional Services Industry, Harvard Law School.  This paper was in-
itially given as the inaugural Frank J. Kelley Lecture at Michigan State University in Sep-
tember 2009.  I want to thank Dean Howarth, Professors Troy Brown and Renee Knake, and 
the other faculty and students who attended that event for their insightful comments on the 
lecture as well as for their gracious hospitality.  I also particularly want to thank Frank Kel-
ley for his generous support of both the lecture series and of the Kelley Institute of Ethics 
that bears his name.  He is a model for the synthesis of public and private responsibilities that 
I hope to describe in this piece.  Kathleen Clark provided very helpful comments on an earli-
er draft, as well as access to her forthcoming papers on the ethical regulation of government 
contractors.  Cory Way provided invaluable research and editorial assistance.   
  1.  Elmer E. White, Michigan Lawyers in History—Frank J. Kelley: The Eternal 
General, 79 MICH. B.J. 688, 688, available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm? 
articleID=87&volumeID=8 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).  424  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
Attorney General Kelley‟s most lasting contribution, however, may 
have been the lesson that he taught his fellow AGs about how to utilize the 
antitrust laws and other civil causes of action to seek restitution and other 
forms of relief against corporations for harms allegedly inflicted on state 
citizens.  As President of the National Association of Attorneys General, 
Kelley was instrumental in mobilizing his counterparts around the country 
to band together to use these potent tools to hold powerful corporations ac-
countable.  During his last years in office, this strategy culminated in the 
massive class action law suits filed by Kelley and other Attorneys General 
against the tobacco companies—litigation that resulted in a $12 billion set-
tlement for the state of Michigan, the largest in the state‟s history.
2   
Given  his  extraordinary  accomplishments,  it  is  unlikely  that  Frank 
Kelley‟s career will ever be duplicated in Michigan, or indeed anywhere 
else.  This is not simply because of the  personal and professional qualities 
that made the man who was affectionately known by his constituents as the 
state‟s “Eternal General” such a beloved figure with Michigan voters.
3  Nor 
is it simply because Michigan now has term limits that would preclude even 
someone as extraordinary as Mr. Kelley from serving ten terms in office.  
Instead, the very structure of twenty-first century legal careers makes it very 
unlikely that more than a tiny handful of those graduating law school today 
will spend thirty-seven years in the same job—whether that job is in the 
public or the private sector.
4   
Indeed, today‟s young lawyers are increasingly likely to build careers 
that move between the public and the private sectors.  Thus, in a ten-year 
nationwide study of lawyers who entered the bar in 2000, my colleagues 
and I determined that more than 50% of lawyers in our sample who changed 
jobs between 2003 and 2007 had also changed practice settings, for example 
moving from private practice to government or vice versa.
5  The economic 
downturn in the private sector market that began in 2008 has only accel e-
rated this trend, as many young lawyers are being offered financial and oth-
   
  2.  Id. at 689. 
  3.  Id. at 688. 
  4.  For example, in a nationwide survey of legal careers conducted in 2003, more 
than one third of all lawyers who entered the bar in 2000 had already changed jobs—and 
more than 44% were planning on changing jobs in the next two years.  RONIT DINOVITZER, 
ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH AND EDUC., AFTER 
THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 53 (2004).  Four years 
later when we surveyed these lawyers again, the average number of jobs held by the entire 
sample was 2—and almost two-thirds had changed jobs at least once since we surveyed them 
in 2003.  RONIT DINOVITZER, ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER 
RESEARCH  AND  EDUC.,  AFTER  THE  JD  II:  SECOND  RESULTS  FROM  A  NATIONAL  STUDY  OF 
LEGAL CAREERS 54 (2009) [hereinafter AJDII]. 
  5.  See AJDII, supra note 4, at 54-60.  Indeed about 50% of lawyers who were 
working in the federal government in 2003 had switched to other practice settings by 2007.  
Id. Summer]  Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction  425 
er incentives to begin their careers in the public sector before (hopefully) 
starting their private sector jobs as associates.
6  
Moreover, mobility is only one way in which the tra ditional bounda-
ries between public and private sector careers have been blurring in recent 
years.  Even lawyers who spend the bulk of their careers in either public or 
private sector roles are likely to find themselves in positions in which their 
duties and responsibilities straddle this traditional divide.  As we found out 
from painful experience over the last few years, lawyers who represent i m-
portant private institutions, such as banks and other financial intermediaries, 
play a crucial role in our public regulatory system.
7  Indeed, after the 2008 
meltdown, many of these institutions are now at least partially owned by 
taxpayers—which, of course, is just a dramatic illustration of the fact that 
deposit  insurance  and  other  forms  of  regulatory  guarantees  have  always 
given the public an important de facto stake in these entities.
8  As globaliza-
tion increasingly forces companies to confront complex issues such as child 
labor, environmental protection, and economic development, the ge neral 
counsels and outside firms that represent these important global players are 
recognizing that they must understand and incorporate a broad set of public 
norms and values if they are to perform these roles effectively.
9  At the same 
time, the government lawyers who oversee thes e institutions find the m-
selves in the position of being charged both with both ensuring that the pr i-
vate lawyers take adequate account of these public norms, and furthering 
government competitiveness policies that give the state a significant role in 
promoting private innovation and market penetration by US companies both 
at home and abroad.
10 
Finally,  the  growing  use  of  “outsourcing”  by  all  levels  of  govern-
ment—including  the  express  outsourcing  of  legal  services—means  that 
many ostensibly “private” lawyers now exercise de jure public authority in 
   
  6.  See Nate Raymond, Deferred Associates Evaluate their Experience in Public 
Interest  Jobs,  N.Y.  L.J.,  Mar.  8,  2010,  available  at  http://www.law.com 
/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202445875118.  
  7.  See  generally  JOHN  C.  COFFEE,  JR.,  GATEKEEPERS:  THE  PROFESSIONS  AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006). 
  8.  See  Steve  Lohr,  U.S.  Investing  $250  Billion  to  Bolster  Bank  Industry,  N.Y. 
TIMES,  Oct.  14,  2008,  at  A1,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages 
/2008/10/13/business/20081014_BAILOUT1_GRAPHIC.html (see the graphic summarizing 
the rescue plan and the largest recipients).  For a discussion of the key role played by federal 
insurance in the banking business, see David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating 
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993). 
  9.  See Ben W. Heineman Jr.  High Performance with High Integrity (Memo to the 
CEO) (2008) (discussing these and other similar examples and arguing that understanding 
and incorporating public norms is key to a corporation‟s long term success). 
  10.  See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1033, 1049-1073 (2007) (noting the multiple and often conflicting public and 
private responsibilities of government lawyers). 426  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
areas  ranging  from  contracting  to  litigation  to  regulatory  counseling.
11  
These private lawyers now work alongside public lawyers to conduct what 
Frank Kelley called “the people‟s business.”  Similarly, private pro bono 
lawyers now provide more legal services to the poor than their state funded 
counterparts in the Legal Services Corporation.
12   
These developments arguably have important implications for the field 
of legal ethics.  Specifically, how should lawyers in p rivate practice incor-
porate public norms in the various contexts in which their roles implicitly or 
explicitly call on them to do so?  How should lawyers for public entities 
account for the interests of private parties in promoting public policies that 
implicate these concerns?  And, how should law schools prepare students 
for careers that are increasingly likely to include time in both public and 
private sector roles? 
Clearly, these are large and difficult questions, and I certainly do not 
pretend that I will answer them here.  Instead, in the remainder of this Essay 
I will simply try to highlight how the changes we are observing in legal 
practice problematize the standard conception of the public -private distinc-
tion that underlies much of the way we think about legal ethics.  I will do so 
by examining the legacy of Frank Kelley‟s most enduring innovation: At-
torneys General bringing suit to recover monetary damages and other relief 
from private companies for injuries allegedly inflicted on state citizens.  In 
the years since Kelley pioneered such actions, lawsuits of this kind have 
become an increasingly important part of the work of many AG offices.  
Moreover, in prosecuting these actions, many of Kelley‟s successors have 
also followed another of his innovations: bringing in private attorneys to 
either supplement or supplant government lawyers in handling some or all 
of the work being done on the matter.  Thus, in the Tobacco Litigation, Kel-
ley  brought  in  two  prominent  plaintiff  class  action  law  firms—Scruggs, 
Millette, Lawson, Bozeman & Dent from Pascaloula Mississippi and Ness, 
Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole from Charleston South Carolina—to 
be “Special Assistant Attorneys General” to work alongside three lawyers 
from  Kelley‟s  newly  created  Environmental  Division  in  prosecuting  the 
case.  In recent years, arrangements of this kind have become increasingly 
common.
13  In Louisiana, for example, Attorney General Buddy Caldwell is 
seeking permission to hire private attorneys to handle litigation against BP 
and other defendants arising out of the recent Deep Water Hor izon disas-
   
  11.  See Kathleen Clark, Ethics for an Outsourced Government (January 19, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
  12.  See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1 
(2004). 
  13.  See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Summer]  Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction  427 
ter.
14  Given both shrinking state budgets and the growing list of potential 
big-ticket claims involving alleged harms to consumers or the environment, 
the number of Attorneys General seeking to create arrangements of this kind 
will, in all likelihood, only increase. 
So too, however, will the controversy surrounding this practice.  When 
Frank Kelley hired Richard “Dickey” Scruggs and Ronald Motley to prose-
cute tobacco companies in Michigan in 1995, he was promptly greeted by a 
motion by the various defendants in the case to disqualify his new Special 
Attorneys General.  Specifically, the tobacco defendants argued that Kelley 
did not have the statutory or constitutional authority to delegate his public 
duties to these private parties, particularly given that the lawyers were not 
being paid either a government salary or an hourly fee but rather an amount 
that would be determined by the court based largely on the recovery they 
obtained  for  the  state.
15  Kelley was able to defeat this effort, as have 
most—although not all—of the Attorneys General who have followed this 
path.  But as a decision by the California Supreme Court in a similar case in 
July 2010 makes clear, the issue continues to be actively litigated and hotly 
contested.
16  The fact that Scruggs was subsequently convicted of conspira-
cy to bribe a judge in Mississippi in an attempt to secure a larger share of a 
$26 million fee in a class action involving claims arising out of Hurricane 
Katrina has only fanned the flames.
17 
   
  14.  Bill  Barrow,  House  Committee  Approves  Hiring  Lawyers  for  Gulf  Oil  Spill 
Cases,  TIMES-PICAYUNE,  June  15,  2010,  available  at  http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/06/house_committee_approves_hirin.html.    Although  the  legislature 
adjourned without reaching a final vote on the matter, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal has 
vowed to ensure that Caldwell has “the tools he needs” to protect the state‟s interest.  Bill 
Barrow, Attorney General Buddy Caldwell‟s Office to Receive Another $5 Million of BP 
Grant,  Jindal  Says,  TIMES-PICAYUNE,  June  23,  2010,  available  at 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil.spill/index.ssf/2010/06/attorney_general_buddy_caldwel 
_2.html [hereinafter Caldwell‟s Office to Receive Another $5 Million]. 
  15.  Brief for Plaintiff at 6 Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. Ingham Cnty.) (1996) (No. 96-84281-CZ) (on file with author).   
  16.  See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court recently denied cert in the case, but as the public reaction to the decision 
suggests, this is unlikely to bring an end to the controversy.  See Abigail Rubenstein, High 
Court Won‟t Hear Calif. Contingency Fee Case, Law 360, Jan. 12, 2011, available at http:// 
www.law360.com/web/articles/219214. 
  17.  See Abha Bhattarai, Class-Action Lawyer Given 5 Years in a Bribery Case, N.Y. 
TIMES,  June  28,  2008,  at  C3,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/business 
/28tort.html?_r=2&sq=scruggs&st=nyt&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&scp=1&adxnnlx=12147475
06-am4UNsWZJnsR/wM7NemCvA.    Not  surprisingly,  the  additional  fact  that  a  federal 
judge publicly accused Scruggs of conspiring with the Attorney General of Mississippi to 
skirt a court order issued in a related case requiring the return of documents that the Attorney 
General believed demonstrated that the same insurance company Scruggs was suing in the 
private class action had committed fraud against policyholders in the state has only added to 
the controversy.  See Jay Reeves, Federal Judge: Mississippi Attorney General Conspired 
with  Trial  Lawyer,  INS.  J.,  June  9,  2008,  available  at  http://www.insurancejournal 
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In the pages that follow, I will not try to adjudicate the merits of this 
dispute between supporters and opponents of deputizing private lawyers to 
pursue public claims against private defendants.  Instead, consistent with 
my overall theme, I will use the dispute over the hiring of what my col-
league William Rubenstein has helpfully labeled as “substitute” private at-
torneys general to elaborate some of the issues raised by the increasing blur-
ring of public and private lawyering roles and to suggest some ways that the 
profession and the public might respond to these challenges.
18 
The rest of my argument proceeds in three parts.  Part II charts the rise 
of the use of substitute attorneys general following Frank Kelley‟s pioneer-
ing efforts in the Tobacco Litigation.  Part III then presents the objections 
that have been raised to this practice and suggests that while these objec-
tions appear unlikely to persuade either politicians or fair minded observers 
to  abandon the  use  of  private  lawyers to  augment  state  enforcement  re-
sources, the critics do underscore the need for policymakers and lawyers to 
address the growing complexity of the responsibilities of both public and 
private lawyers in this area.  Part IV concludes with some brief observations 
about what it will take for the profession to create a set of institutional ar-
rangements and ethical norms capable of defining and reinforcing a worka-
ble set of understandings for how lawyers should conceptualize and dis-
charge their public and private responsibilities in particular lawyering con-
texts.  
II. THE RISE OF “SUBSTITUTE” ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Frank Kelley certainly did not invent the idea of hiring private lawyers 
to  represent  the  government‟s  interest  in  specific  proceedings.    At  least 
since Brown v. Board of Education, public lawyers have brought in legal 
heavy weights to argue important cases in the United States Supreme Court 
and in other high stakes proceedings.
19  In 1997, for example, the United 
   
.com/news/southeast/2008/06/09/90752.htm.  I return to the fact that documents discovered 
in private litigation may be used to support public causes of action brought by Attorneys 
General—and that documents discovered in public actions often fuel private “coattail” class 
action litigation—below.  
  18.  See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” is—and 
Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2143-55 (2004) (distinguishing  “substitute” private 
attorneys  general  who—at  least  in  theory—“perform  the  exact  functions  of  the  attorney 
general‟s office” from either “supplemental” private attorneys general, who bring private 
litigation to vindicate public rights, and “simulated” private attorneys general, whose actions 
on behalf of a private party generate a common fund that benefits other private parties).  I 
return to Rubenstein‟s helpful analysis below. 
  19.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION  AND BLACK AMERICA‟S STRUGGLE  FOR EQUALITY 529-31 (Vintage Books ed., 
2004) (1975) (describing how the state of South Carolina hired John W. Davis, former U.S. 
Solicitor General and founder of the Wall Street law firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunder-
 Summer]  Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction  429 
States Department of Justice hired famed litigator David Boies to try the 
government‟s antitrust case against Microsoft.
20  In addition, state officials 
sometimes retain private counsel even when they are being sued in their 
official capacity.
21  On other occasions, public lawyers bring in “special 
prosecutors” to investigate and prosecute public officials accused of wrong-
doing in circumstances where the impartiality of a similar investigation by 
public lawyers might legitimately be called into question.
22  Indeed, in many 
small towns it is not  uncommon for many  governmental lawyering fun c-
tions to be performed by private attorneys acting on a part-time basis. 
These typical practices, however, differ from what Kelley and his fe l-
low Attorneys General did in the Tobacco Litigation in two related respects.  
First, unlike most of the instances where private attorneys have traditionally 
been used, the Tobacco cases sought to recover monetary damages from 
private companies on the basis of torts that the defendants allegedly co m-
mitted against the state‟s citizens.  Thus, in the Tobacco cases, the states 
argued that cigarette manufacturers should be held liable for all of the costs 
that state governments were forced to expend paying for the harms inflicted 
on their residents as a result of smoking.
23  Although damages are certainly 
possible in antitrust actions such as the one at issue in the Microsoft litig a-
tion, as Professor Howard Erichson notes, “the role of collecting money 
damages  for  antitrust  harm  has  more  commonly  fallen  to  private  plain-
   
land & Kiendl to defend “separate but equal” in the famous Supreme Court case).  According 
to Kluger, the state “turned the case over to Davis without any strings attached.”  Id. at 545.  
I return to the question of control below. 
  20.  Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobac-
co, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 17 (2000).  Indeed, as Jack Coffee points out, after some states refused to accept the 
settlement between Microsoft and the government at the end of the liability stage, both the 
objectors and the government hired high profile private lawyers to represent their respective 
interests in the litigation over whether the agreement should be upheld.  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
“When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality About the Synthesis of Private Counsel 
and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 242-43 (2001) (describing how California hired 
Brendan Sullivan from Williams & Connolly to challenge the settlement, while the federal 
government brought in Phillip Beck from Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott to defend 
it).  Ironically, two years later Boies and Beck would square off in litigation culminating in 
the Supreme Court‟s consideration of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), arguably the most 
important Supreme Court case since Brown v. Board of Education, in which both represented 
public officials claiming that they were entitled to occupy the highest office in the land. 
  21.  See  Nanette  Asimov  &  Lance  Williams,  Gov.  Davis  vs.  Schoolkids—High 
Priced Legal Team Browbeats Youths About Shoddy Schools, S. F. CHRON, Sept. 2, 2001, at 
A1 (describing how California Governor Gray Davis hired the law firm of O‟Melveny & 
Meyers to defend him against a law suit challenging the conditions in California schools).   
  22.  See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2143 (discussing the federal special prosecutor 
statute).  
  23.  Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder Jr., The Many Virtues of Tobacco 
Litigation: In the Failed Global Settlement, the Tobacco Industry Almost Freed Itself from 
the Civil Justice System, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 34 (describing the cause of action). 430  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
tiffs.”
24  Second, unlike most of the attorneys in the cases described above, 
the lawyers engaged in the Tobacco Litigation were neither paid a govern-
ment salary nor an hourly fee.
25  Instead, to varying degrees the lawyers 
hired by Frank Kelley and other Attorneys General were paid a fee that was 
heavily contingent on the size of the recovery that they generated in the 
case.
26 
In the years following the record -breaking Tobacco settlements, both 
of these aspects have become increasingly common in cases in which pr i-
vate lawyers have been brought in to conduct litigation against private pa r-
ties.  Just two years after Frank Kelley and his fellow Attorne ys General 
settled the Tobacco L itigation, several states and mun icipalities filed law 
suits against gun manufacturers and ot her related parties alleging theories 
about the recoupment of medical and other expenses similar to those a s-
serted in the Tobacco Litigation.
27  Similar actions, involving similar theo-
ries, have been filed against the manufactu rers of lead paint, HMOs and 
other health care providers, brewers and distil lers, fast food chains, and in 
the years since the housing market crash, mor tgage lenders.
28  In many—
   
  24.  Erichson, supra note 20, at 19.  Indeed, in the Microsoft case itself, the govern-
ment primarily sought various forms of injunctive relief, including the break-up of the com-
pany.  See Massachusetts ex rel. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (reporting that “[t]he two complaints . . . sought various forms of relief, including an 
injunction against certain of Microsoft‟s business practices”). 
  25.  In the Microsoft case, for example, the Justice Department paid Daivd Boies a 
reduced hourly fee of $250 per hour—down significantly from the $600 an hour he typically 
charged his private clients while at Cravath.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, Readying the Slingshot 
for a Modern Goliath, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at B2.   
  26.  I return to the question of whether it matters if the fee is entirely contingent or, 
as is more commonly the case, the product of some form of arbitration or judicial determina-
tion.  Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in most of these cases “the lawyers would have re-
ceived nothing had there been no recovery, and the amounts were driven largely by the size 
of the recovery.”  Erichson, supra note 20, at 18. 
  27.  See Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs‟ Attor-
neys  in  Municipal  Gun  Litigation,  in  SUING  THE  GUN  INDUSTRY:  A  BATTLE  AT  THE 
CROSSROADS  OF  GUN  CONTROL  AND  MASS  TORTS  129,  138-39  (Timothy  D.  Lytton,  ed., 
2005). 
  28.  See,  e.g.,  Adam  Liptak,  A  Deal  for the  Public:  If  You  Win, You  Lose, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A10 (describing several pollution cases); Walter Olson, Op-Ed, Tort 
Travesty, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2007, at A17 (reporting that “trial lawyers representing pub-
lic clients on contingency fee are suing businesses for billions over matters as diverse as 
prescription drug pricing, natural gas royalties and the calculation of back tax bills”); Cnty. 
of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 25, 25 (Cal. 2010) (reporting that the litigation 
concerns “[a] group of public entities . . . prosecuting a public-nuisance action against nu-
merous businesses that manufactured lead paint”); Erichson, supra note 20, at 20-21 (de-
scribing actual and potential litigation against other industries); E. Scott Reckard, Country-
wide  Sued  by  State  Over  Lending,  L.A.  TIMES,  June  26,  2008,  at  C1,  available  at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/26/business/fi-country26  (describing  California‟s  suit 
against Countrywide). Summer]  Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction  431 
although certainly not all—of these cases, private lawyers have played a key 
role.  Indeed, many of these actions have been brought by the same lawyers 
who prosecuted the Tobacco cases, who were once again deputized as spe-
cial attorneys general for this purpose.
29  And, like the lawyers Frank Kelley 
retained in Tobacco, many of these lawyers are being paid on the  basis of 
fees that are substantially contingent on the outcome of the case.
30  As indi-
cated above, the litigation that will inevitably follow the BP disaster may 
very well take a similar course. 
A number of factors are driving these developments.  First and  fore-
most is money.  Not surprisingly, most of the consumer, environmental, and 
regulatory actions brought by states in recent years involve large companies 
accused of causing widespread harm.
31  As a result, the defendants in these 
cases have deep pockets and are capable of hiring the best legal talent mon-
ey can buy to wear down their opponents, even when that opponent is the 
state.  As Frank Kelley was quick to point out in the opening section of his 
brief in opposition to the Tobacco defendants‟ efforts to disqualify the pri-
vate attorneys he brought in to prosecute the case, “[i]t is no secret that the 
Defendants have mustered an army of the nation‟s largest law firms, which 
include hundreds of attorneys, to fight a scorched-earth war.”
32  As a result, 
   
  29.  See Erichson, supra note 27, at 137-38 (reporting that Wendell Gauthier and a 
group of lawyers known as the Castano Group for their role in the Tobacco Litigation played 
a key role in several law suits by municipalities against gun manufacturers). 
  30.  See Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 36; see, e.g., Erichson, supra note 27, at 
137 (reporting that “New Orleans retained the Castano Group to represent the city on a con-
tingent fee basis: the attorneys would get 20 percent of the recovery if the case settled and 30 
percent if it went to trial verdict”). 
  31.  See generally Hanoch Dagan & James White, Governments, Citizens, and Inju-
rious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (2000) (describing the rise of such law suits).  It is 
important to recognize that this may not always be the case.  In People ex rel. Clancy v. 
Superior Court, for example, the City of Corona, California, hired a private attorney to bring 
a nuisance abatement action against a small adult bookstore, agreeing to double the attor-
ney‟s $30 hourly rate if the action was successful.  705 P.2d 347, 348, 350 (Cal. 1985).  In 
County of Santa Clara, the California Supreme Court relied in part on the Clancy defen-
dant‟s relatively small size to distinguish the holding in that case prohibiting the City of 
Corona from retaining a private lawyer on a contingent fee from its decision to allow Santa 
Clara and other counties and municipalities to use contingent fees in compensating private 
lawyers working as special attorneys general in prosecuting large companies responsible for 
manufacturing and distributing lead paint.  235 P.3d at 34 (noting that “[d]efendants are large 
corporations with access to abundant monetary and legal resources”).  I return to this distinc-
tion below. 
  32.  Plaintiffs‟ Brief in Opposition To Defendants‟ Motion To Disqualify the Attor-
ney General‟s “Unlawfully Retained Contingent Fee” Counsel, Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. 
Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-842181-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Ingham Cnty. 1996) [hereinafter Kel-
ley Brief], available at http://stic.neu.edu/mi/MTDCOU~1.htm.  In a masterful bit of strategy 
designed to drive this point home, Kelley opened his brief by quoting a lawyer for RJR Rey-
nolds as crowing that “„the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [RJR}‟s[sic] 
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Kelley “deemed it to be in the State‟s best interest to assign three Assistant 
Attorneys General to the case and then to retain Special Assistant Attorneys 
General with experience in tobacco litigation to assist in the prosecution of 
the lawsuit.”
33 
The word “experienced” is important here.  Governments clearly have 
their own lawyers—and as Frank Kelley himself amply demonstrates, often 
very good ones.  Indeed, as the above quote indicates, Kelley had three full 
time assistants working on the Tobacco case.  I will return to the role of 
these government lawyers below.  But as the Microsoft case demonstrates, 
even in circumstances where the government unquestionably has significant 
resources, public lawyers may still believe that they need the assistance of 
private lawyers with unique skills or experience in order to take on compa-
nies that will inevitably marshal the best legal talent money can buy in their 
own defense.
34 
Moreover, financial considerations have also pushed states to favor 
hiring these experienced lawyers on some form of a contingent fee.  To be 
sure, some states and localities have decided to follow the Justice Depar t-
ment‟s lead in the Microsoft case and hire outside lawyers on a reduced 
hourly fee, or to enlist private lawyers to assist their case pro bono.
35  Most, 
however, have opted in favor of arrangements where the outside lawyers 
will only be paid if the litigation is successful, and where the size of their 
fee (whether as a matter of contract or judicial determination—a distinction 
to which I will return below), will depend largely on the amount recovered 
in the litigation.  Such arrangements obviously relieve states from the finan-
cial burden of paying the hourly rates of top lawyers—rates that have esca-
lated significantly even since the Microsoft action.
36  But even if a state or 
   
money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all of his.‟”  Id. (quoting Haines v. 
Ligget Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D. N.J. 1993). 
  33.  Id. 
  34.  See Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery: Hired Guns Corral Contin-
gent Fee Bonanza, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27 (arguing that hiring private lawyers 
“might be justified to acquire unique outside competence or experience”); see also Erichson, 
supra note 27, at 135-37 (describing the expertise of the lawyers who brought the tobacco 
and gun cases). 
  35.  See Erichson, supra note 27, at 138 (describing Chicago‟s decision not to bring 
in plaintiff contingent fee lawyers but to instead rely on a combination of city attorneys, a 
law professor compensated by the hour, and two law firms working on a pro bono basis).  I 
return to this case and Professor Erichson‟s analysis below. 
  36.  As noted above, Boies reduced his $600 per hour billing rate to $250 when 
working for the federal government.  See Bumiller, supra note 25.  Today, many mid-level 
associates bill out at rates higher than $250 an hour, while partners of Boies‟s stature routine-
ly charge more than $1000 an hour.  See, e.g., Jenna Greene, NY Billing Rates the Highest, 
but  Guess  Who  Comes  in  Second?,  LEGAL  TIMES,  Sept.  13,  2010,  available  at  
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202471972166  (citing  “[a]  massive 
study of billing rates” revealing that associates in Washington, D.C., for example, charge 
about “$375 an hour on average,” representing “a relative bargain” compared to other mar-
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municipality were able to find lawyers with the requisite expertise and expe-
rience who were willing to work for an hourly rate that the government was 
willing or able to pay, officials would still have to fund the significant up-
front costs and expenses that often are required to mount cases of this kind 
out of public coffers.
37  Contingent fee contracts typically shift some or all 
of these expenses to the outside lawyers.
38  In an age of dwindling state 
budgets, it is likely, as one commentator observed, that there will be “indus-
tries that will not be taken on, there are cases that will not be brought, unless 
we allow contingency fees.”
39 
But money alone does not tell the entire story.  Public lawyers also 
have political incentives for bringing in high profile private lawyers to assist 
them in high profile cases.  At the state and municipal levels, top public 
lawyers almost always stand for election.  Moreover, these offices often 
serve as a stepping-stone to higher office at the city, state, or federal level.
40  
Not surprisingly, in seeking to woo voters these lawyer/candidates are quick 
to tout their experience in helping to shape public policy by curbing corp o-
rate abuses through litigation against defendants like tobacco companies and 
mortgage lenders.
41  Needless to say, this strategy is unlikely to be partic u-
larly successful—at least in the long run—unless the case itself is success-
fully concluded.  To the extent that engaging the services of heavy weight 
private attorneys increases the odds that the government will be victorious, 
this political incentive is likely to lead to more such lawyers being hired.   
Paradoxically, the political risks associated with losing one of these 
high-profile cases also increases the incentive to bring in special attorneys 
general.  As much as public lawyers seeking higher office like being seen as 
champions for the people when they bring these kinds of cases, they ration-
   
kets such as New York City); Amy Miller, Survey Shows Law Firms Charging Different 
Rates  for  the  Same  Work,  CORP.  COUNS.,  May  26,  2010,  available  at  http://www.law 
.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202458774347  (reporting  that  “[i]n  2009,  partners  at  law  firms 
charged up to $1,590 per hour for work with major corporate clients”). 
  37.  See  Erichson,  supra  note 27,  at  135  (describing  the  large,  up-front  expenses 
required to mount this kind of litigation). 
  38.  See Erichson, supra note 20, at 38 n.185 (quoting Mississippi‟s Attorney Gener-
al as telling the Tobacco litigation lawyers that “you are going to have to pay all the expenses 
and it may be as much as $10 or $12 million”).   
  39.  Barbra S. Gillers, Remarks at the Fordham University Law Review Panel Dis-
cussion: The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys‟ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2840-41 
(1999). 
  40.  See John Gramlich, On Campaign Trail, Attorneys General Walk a Fine Line, 
STATELINE,  July  21,  2010,  http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=499873 
(describing Michigan‟s former Attorney General Mike Cox‟s run for governor and noting 
that in 2010 there were “nine other attorneys general who are running for higher office this 
year (seven for governor and two for U.S. Senate”). 
  41.  See id. (describing how attorneys general running for higher office have used 
litigation against tobacco, social networking and mortgage companies to garner publicity and 
burnish their credentials). 434  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
ally fear the consequences of losing them even more, since doing so calls 
into question both their decision to bring the case and their competence in 
prosecuting the litigation.  Bringing in high powered outside talent provides 
a partial hedge against this latter risk.  If the case is successful, the Attorney 
General can proudly take credit for the victory.  But if the case is unsuccess-
ful, the same public official can implicitly blame the setback on the outside 
lawyer‟s failure to present a persuasive case—a failure that the Attorney 
General could not reasonably have anticipated in light of the private law-
yer‟s stellar reputation in litigating actions of this kind.  As Jack Coffee 
argues, political considerations such as these also help to explain why state 
lawyers favor contingent fees and other similar arrangements since paying 
the lawyers only if the case is successful frees the Attorney General from 
the risk of having to later publicly explain to the legislature why significant 
state funds were “wasted” on a losing effort.
42  But the fact that the general 
counsels of large private companies frequently rely on a similar strategy of 
bringing in high profile—and frequently high priced—outside legal talent as 
a means of protecting themselves against the downside risks of losing a big 
case (“But I hired Cravath!”) underscores that the politics of CYA (or more 
politely hedging one‟s bet) are not confined to the contingent fee context.
43 
Collectively, these monetary and political incentives make it likely 
that cash-strapped states and municipalities will turn to hiring “substitute” 
attorneys general with increasing frequency.  These same incentives also 
underscore why this practice has become increasingly controversial. 
III.  SHOULD PRIVATE CONTINGENT FEE LAWYERS EXERCISE PUBLIC 
POWER? 
Critics raise several objections to state officials hiring “substitute” pri-
vate attorneys general, particularly if these lawyers are paid on the basis of 
some form of contingent fee.  As an initial matter, some critics argue this 
practice exceeds the Attorney General‟s statutory authority to appoint spe-
cial attorneys general, or is otherwise prohibited by particular provisions of 
the state‟s constitution.  These arguments turn primarily on the specific lan-
guage  of  the  statutes  and  state  constitutional  provisions  in  question  and 
therefore have relatively little impact on the broader questions I am discuss-
   
  42.  Coffee, supra note 20, at 251.  Of course, if a case is either settled or abandoned 
prior to a complaint being filed there is likely to be far less publicity.  To the extent that 
actions of this kind are typically disposed of in this manner, the incentives created by either 
favorable or unfavorable publicity discussed in the text will therefore be diminished.  I return 
to the question of settlement below. 
  43.  See David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Perliminary Look at Black 
Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15, 32-33 (1999) (citing 
this practice as a reason why it is difficult for minority partners to get business, particularly 
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ing here.  Moreover, enough state courts have ruled against such claims,
44—
and  enough  state  legislatures  have  specifically  authorized  hiring  special 
attorneys general on a contingent fee basis
45 (provided that these lawyers 
work under the supervision and control of public officials)
46 that the un-
derlying question of whether to allow private lawyers to exercise state pow-
er in this manner is unlikely to be resolved on the basis of a narrow reading 
of the Attorney General‟s statutory or constitutional authority in this area.   
Nor is it likely that the matter will be resolved on the basis of the gen-
eral fear that hiring lawyers in this fashion is an invitation to corruption.  As 
the conviction of Dickey Scruggs described above underscores, there is sad-
ly evidence that some public officials and the special attorneys general that 
they have retained have had the kind of “special” relationship where the 
latter has “paid to play” this particular role.
47  Needless to say, these are 
serious charges.  But as others have indicated, they are not unique to this 
context.  The phrase “pay-to-play” comes from the widespread practice in 
the 1980s of law firms and investment banks lavishly supporting politicians 
who were in a position to give these firms a piece of the lucrative municipal 
bond business.
48  With few exceptions, the banks and law firms that engaged 
in this practice had much more in common with the law firms that represent 
the parties who are objecting to hiring substitute attor neys general in these 
cases than the plaintiffs‟ lawyers who have typically been hired for this 
   
  44.  See, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 41 (Cal. 2010); 
Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass‟n, 951 A.2d 428, 480 (R.I. 2008). 
  45.  See,  e.g.,  VA.  CODE  ANN.  §  2.2-510.1  (2005);  TEX.  GOV‟T  CODE  ANN.  § 
2254.103 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-301 to 13-17-304 (2006); see also Mark 
A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: Procedural 
Reforms  Have  Gained  Steam,  But  Critics  Still  Focus  on  Arguments  of  the  Past,  31  U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 173, 182-83 (2006) (discussing state authorization and regulation of an 
Attorney General‟s ability to enter into contingent fee agreements).  By contrast, federal 
agencies are generally barred from using contingent fee lawyers under an Executive Order 
signed by President Bush.  See Exec. Order No. 13433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28441 (May 16, 2007). 
  46.  I will return to the question of exactly how much supervision and control public 
officials are required to exercise—and the credibility of their claim to do so—below. 
  47.  For example,  former Texas Attorney  General Dan Morales was sentenced to 
four years in prison for attempting to steer over $1 million in legal fees to himself and anoth-
er lawyer from the state‟s $17 billion tobacco settlement.  See Steve Barnes, National Brief-
ing, Southwest—Texas: Prison for Ex-Official, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at A12, available 
at  http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/01/us/national-briefing-southwest-texas-prison-for-ex-
official.html?ref=dan_morales.  Similar charges have been leveled at others.  See generally 
Lester Brickman, Remarks at the Fordham University Law Review Panel Discussion: The 
Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys‟ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2849 (1999) (arguing 
that “[i]n most states, the hiring was done on a pay-to-play basis” and that many lawyers 
were “selected on the basis of the campaign contributions that they made to the state attor-
neys general”). 
  48.  See Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of “Pay-to-Play” and the Influence of Politi-
cal Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 489, 494 
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role.
49  This is not to say, of course, that the possibility of such sweetheart 
deals should be ignored in this context just because it is present in others.  
Instead, my point is that the best ways to address “pay-to-play” in hiring 
substitute attorneys general are likely to be similar to those used in other 
contexts—a general point to which I shall return below.  As a result, the 
existence of this danger does not provide a special reason for prohibiting the 
hiring of substitute counsel.
50 
A similar argument applies to critics who object to hiring substitute at-
torneys general on a contingent fee basis for reasons that are equally a ppli-
cable to the use of contingent fees in general.  Not surprisingly, some of the 
most vociferous critics of the Tobacco Litigation and other similar cases are 
the same people who have been railing against the contingent fee in particu-
lar, and the litigation system in general, for years.
51  Although it is possible 
that these critics will one day win their battle against contingent fees, these 
arguments have little relevance for the specific question of whether public 
policy should allow their use in this particular setting.  
Recognizing that neither statutory interpretation nor allegations of cor-
ruption are likely to carry the day, those who object to the growth in substi-
tute attorneys general raise two other interrelated reasons for condemning 
this trend.  First, even critics who generally  support the use of contingent 
fees in the context of private litigation nevertheless assert that lawyers who 
are paid on this basis will have an inherent and impermissible conflict of 
interest when they act as substitute attorneys general.  Contingent fee  law-
yers, according to this argument, seek only to maximize their fees while 
those who exercise government power should work to maximize the public 
interest.
52  For these critics, the analogy is to a public prosecutor whose 
compensation depends upon obtaining convictions.
53  Second, many of these 
same critics assert that contingent fee and other related contracts in this set-
ting undermine fundamental democratic values, either by reducing the legis-
   
  49.  See David B. Wilkins, “If You Can‟t Join „Em, Beat „Em!”  The Rise and Fall of 
the Black Corporate Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1733, 1770-72 (2008) (arguing that larger 
firms tended to benefit the most from “pay-to-play” in the municipal bond area). 
  50.  See Erichson, supra note 20, at 35 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
  51.  See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION 
ELITE THREATENS AMERICA‟S RULE OF LAW 102-03, 107-08 (2003); Brickman, supra note 
47, at 2830-33.  Brickman has been one of the most ardent critics of the use of contingent 
fees.  See, e.g., Lester Brickman, A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder to On the Theory Class‟s 
Theories of Asbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 781, 788 (2005).  Similarly, as the title of 
his book implies, Olson is one of the leading critics of the “evils” of the litigation system.   
  52.  See Erichson, supra note 20, at 36-38. 
  53.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: 
Constitutional and Political Implications 4-5 (Apr. 7-8, 2008) (written for the Searle Cen-
ter‟s 2008 Research Roundtable on Expansion of Liability Under Public Nuisance (on file 
with author)) (citing this analogy and arguing that “[i]t is difficult to imagine an arrangement 
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latures‟ ability to check prosecutorial discretion or by violating the zone of 
freedom from state action to which individual defendants are entitled under 
our democratic form of government.
54 
Once again, both of these arguments have merit.  As Professor Steven 
Berenson  has  observed,  “[i]t  is  an  uncontroversial  proposition  in  main-
stream American legal thought that government lawyers have greater re-
sponsibilities to pursue the common good or the public interest than their 
counterparts in private practice, who represent non-governmental persons 
and entities.”
55  As I will argue in the next part, a set of connected changes 
in both the public and private spheres, of which the practice of hiring substi-
tute attorneys general on contingent fees is just one example, have made the 
meaning of Professor Berenson‟s “uncontroversial” assumption significant-
ly more problematic and complex for both government lawyers and private 
practitioners in many situations.  Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine a plaus-
ible regime in which public lawyers are not charged with special responsi-
bility for making decisions in the public interest that go beyond those of 
private lawyers.  Moreover, this is particularly true of public prosecutors, 
who are granted the authority and the duty to bring the full force of the state 
against those who transgress its laws.  In such circumstances, it does indeed 
seem appropriately “uncontroversial”—and indeed essential—that the pros-
ecutor‟s goal “in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.”
56  A system that paid prosecutors on the basis of 
the number of convictions they obtain would clearly undermine this objec-
tive. 
The question remains, however, whether this uncontroversial—and in-
controvertible—fact  is  sufficient  to  rule  all  contingent  fee  contracts  for 
substitute attorneys general out of bounds.  Although, as I said at the outset, 
I do not intend to adjudicate this claim definitively here, there are several 
reasons to suspect that the analogy to criminal prosecutors is not as persua-
sive as some critics have suggested—and that the distance between what is 
actually going on in most of these cases and practices that these same critics 
deem acceptable and even desirable is far less than they appear to believe.  
With respect to the former, it has long been recognized that the criminal 
context confers special duties on prosecutors—and special rights on defen-
dants—that  distinguish  it  from  other  kinds  of  litigation,  even  where  the 
government is a party.  Prosecutors in criminal cases have a constitutional 
   
  54.  See Erichson, supra note 20, at 38-40 (articulating the first objection that contin-
gent fees remove appropriate legislative checks on prosecutors); Redish, supra note 53, at 
32-33 (articulating the second objection relating to the Due Process rights of defendants) (see 
also the sources cited therein). 
  55.  Steven K. Berenson,  Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will 
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000). 
  56.  See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 438  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
duty to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence,
57 ensure that defendants 
are made aware of their right against self -incrimination,
58 and refrain from 
using evidence that was collected in violation of the defendant‟s right to 
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.
59  To 
ensure the prosecutor‟s compliance with these mandates, defendants are in 
turn guaranteed the right to an attorney
60 who must represent their interests 
“effectively” for a conviction to be upheld.
61  None of these duties or rights 
applies in civil litigation.  To be sure, these differences do not mean that 
outside of the criminal context, prosecutors have no obligation to “seek jus-
tice” instead of mere victory.
62  It is just to note that this obligation is not the 
same as the duties that prosecutors have in criminal cases. 
The California Supreme Court‟s recent decision in County of Santa 
Clara v. Superior Court underscores this distinction.
63  In Santa Clara, a 
group of businesses being sued in a public nuisance action by a number of 
California counties and cities for manufacturing and distributing lead paint 
sought to bar the public entities from compensating their privately retained 
counsel by means of contingent fees.
64  In making this claim, the defendants 
relied on People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court
65 in which the same court 
in 1985 invoked the strict neutrality principle applicable to criminal prose-
cutions to bar a municipality from paying a private lawyer a partial contin-
gent fee to prosecute a public nuisance action against the owner of a small 
adult bookstore.
66  In Santa Clara, however, the court made clear that not 
every civil case in which the government is a litigant “invoke[s] the same 
constitutional and institutional interests present in a criminal case.”
67  Thus, 
when the government is acting as an “ordinary” litigant enforcing its own 
contract and property rights,” the court observed, “we do not require neu-
trality.”
68  Although the public nuisance actions at issue in Santa Clara are 
   
  57.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
  58.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
  59.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
  60.  Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
  61.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). 
  62.  Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 
9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 256 (2000) (arguing that “[j]udicial decisions and other profes-
sional writings take the view that, even outside the context of criminal prosecutions, gov-
ernment litigators have a different role and different ethical responsibilities from lawyers 
representing private litigants”). 
  63.  235 P.3d 21, 35-36 (Cal. 2010). 
  64.  Id. at 25. 
  65.  705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985). 
  66.  Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 29 (citing Clancy as holding that “the neutrali-
ty rules applicable to criminal prosecutors were equally applicable to government attorneys 
prosecuting certain civil cases”). 
  67.  Id. at 31.   
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not simply private, the court acknowledged, neither do they invoke the same 
kind of liberty interests at stake in the typical criminal case, or even the 
threat of shutting down an ongoing business at issue in Clancy.  Instead, “at 
most” defendants will have to “expend resources to abate the lead-paint 
nuisance they allegedly created,” which, the court underscored, is the “type 
of remedy one might find in an ordinary civil case.”
69  As a result, the court 
concluded, actions of this kind do not “affect the type of fundamental rights 
implicated in criminal prosecutions or in Clancy,” and therefore, “the abso-
lute prohibition on contingent-fee arrangements imported in Clancy from 
the context of criminal proceedings is unwarranted.”
70 
Moreover,  in  deciding  the  conditions  under  which  contingent  fees 
should be allowed in public nuisance actions of this kind, the Santa Clara 
court highlighted several other features of this type of litigation that are 
plausibly relevant to a fair determination of whether hiring substitute attor-
neys general on this basis threatens important systemic values.  In most 
criminal prosecutions, the court observed, there was a “profound imbalance 
between the institutional power and resources of the government and the 
limited means and influence of the defendants—whose vital property rights 
were threatened.”
71  As the court correctly notes, however, in the case before 
it—and in virtually all of the recent cases where governments have sought 
to bring in substitute attorneys general—there is no such imbalance.  In-
stead, these defendants tend to be “large corporations with access to abun-
dant monetary and legal resources.”
72  A quick perusal of the who‟s who of 
lawyers representing the defendants in Santa Clara makes abundantly clear 
that these powerful actors are making full use of the opportunity that their 
size and resources afford them to mount a vigorous defense.
73  As a result, 
the risk that the government will abuse its authority by either ove rreaching 
or applying economic coercion, as the  Santa  Clara  court  correctly  con-
cluded, is significantly reduced.
74 
   
  69.  Id. at 34. 
  70.  Id. at 34-35; see also Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2146 (arguing that “[t]he 
substitute attorney general is a first step on the spectrum away from the purely public side; 
she is removed not only because she is a private attorney substituting for a public one, but 
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core of the attorney general‟s work”). 
  71.  Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 32. 
  72.  Id. at 34. 
  73.  See id. at 24-25 (listing such prominent law firms as Arnold & Porter; Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe; McGuire Woods; Jones Day; Shook, Hardy & Bacon; Latham & 
Watkins; and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld as appearing on behalf of the defendants). 
  74.  To say that the defendants‟ size and resources “reduces” the risk of government 
overreaching should not be read to imply that there is no danger of attorneys general abusing 
their power when pursuing powerful private corporations.  One need only look at the De-
partment of Justice‟s ability to force companies to “voluntarily” waive their attorney-client 
privilege as a pre-condition to even obtaining a hearing with government officials to under-
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Finally, the Santa Clara court stressed that the situation before it dif-
fered fundamentally from one where a criminal prosecutor—or any other 
decision-maker with ultimate authority—was being paid on the basis of the 
outcome of the case because “neutral, conflict-free government attorneys 
retain the power to control and supervise the litigation.”
75  This control and 
supervision, the court emphasized, must go beyond “boilerplate language” 
to “specifically provide that decisions regarding settlement of the case are 
reserved exclusively to the discretion of the public entity‟s own attorneys” 
and “that any defendant that is the subject of such litigation may contact the 
lead government attorneys directly, without having to confer with contin-
gent-fee counsel.”
76  Citing the Rhode Island Supreme Court‟s recent ap-
proval of contingent fees in a similar public nuisance case against the manu-
facturers  of  lead  paint,  the  Santa  Clara  court  went  on  to  endorse  three 
guidelines  for  determining  whether  agreements  between  public  attorneys 
general and the private lawyers they bring in on a contingent fee basis to 
assist them pass muster: 
   
stand that the state has potent weapons capable of bringing even the most powerful private 
corporation to its knees.  See Gretchen Elizabeth Eoff, Losing the War on Attorney-Client 
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collective action problems, and the threat of issue preclusion in subsequent private litiga-
tion—that give public litigants a significant advantage when taking on powerful corporation 
like the tobacco companies.  Erichson, supra note 20, at 28-30.  As I argue below, these 
advantages—and their concomitant potential for abuse—are relevant to defining what the 
public responsibilities of government lawyers toward the private parties over whom they 
inevitably hold power should be.  In defining these responsibilities, however, it is also impor-
tant to account for  the ability that corporate clients have to press public officials to curb their 
abusive practices—a strategy that has resulted in a significant modification (albeit certainly 
less than what many companies and their lawyers would have wanted to see) of the Justice 
Department‟s policy concerning the circumstances where it is appropriate to ask companies 
to waive their attorney-client privilege.  See, e.g., David Z. Seide, Is the Department of Jus-
tice‟s McNulty Memorandum a Cure-All?, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar.-Apr. 2007, 
at  1,  1-4,  available  at  http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog 
/files/seide_article_is_the_dojs_mcnulty_memo_a_cureall.pdf  (describing  the  efforts  that 
lead up to the revision of the Justice Department‟s original waiver policy and adoption of the 
McNulty Memo); see also Attorney-Client Privilege Bill Introduced in the House, MAIN 
JUST.  (Dec.  17,  2009,  9:59  PM),  http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/12/17/attorney-client-
privilege-bill-introduced-in-the-house/ (reporting on efforts to introduce a bill to prohibit the 
Justice Department from requesting a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as a measure of 
cooperation in civil and criminal investigations). 
  75.  Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 36. 
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Contingent-fee agreements between public entities and private counsel must pro-
vide:  (1)  that  the  public-entity  attorneys  will  retain  complete  control  over  the 
course and conduct of the case; (2) that government attorneys retain a veto power 
over any decisions made by outside counsel; and (3) that a government attorney 
with supervisory authority must be personally involved in overseeing the litiga-
tion.
77 
Then and only then, the court concluded, is it permissible for government 
officials to bring in substitute attorneys general on this basis. 
Not  surprisingly,  those  who  oppose  this  practice  have  questioned 
whether this kind of supervision can ever really be effective in practice.  
Lawyers  with  day-to-day  responsibility  for  litigating  cases,  these  critics 
argue,  inevitably  exercise  significant  discretion  over  which  strategies  to 
pursue and how to pursue them.  Given their strong financial interest in 
maximizing the size of the monetary recovery from which their fees will be 
paid (whether directly or indirectly), contingent fee lawyers will invariably 
steer the litigation in ways that place their own financial interests over those 
of their putative public supervisors and the public interest these officials are 
supposed to represent.
78  Moreover, the failure of state officials to check this 
natural tendency will be virtually impossible for either defendants or courts 
to see since most of the conversations upon whic h any such assessment 
would be based will be held in private, and will arguably be shielded by 
either the work product or the attorney-client privilege.
79  The fact that gov-
ernment lawyers have been promising to constrain this “investment mentali-
ty” since the days that Frank Kelley and his fellow AGs first pioneered this 
form of litigation in the Tobacco cases
80 is hardly likely to give those who 
are skeptical about the effectiveness of public oversight much comfort. 
Once again, these are far from frivolous c oncerns.  As Professor 
Erichson has documented, for example, one can see the potential impact of 
the incentives that private contingent fee lawyers bring to these kinds of 
   
  77.  Id. at 40. 
  78.  See Redish, supra note 53, at 18-19 (making this claim). 
  79.  See Press Release, John H. Sullivan, President of the Civil Justice Ass‟n of Cal., 
Statement  on  County  of  Santa  Clara  v.  Superior  Court,  (July  26,  2010),  available  at 
http://www.cjac.org/newsandresearch/press-releases/county-of-santa-clara-v-superi/ (criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court‟s test in Santa Clara by asking “[h]ow is any objective observer to 
know whether „oversight‟ requirements such as „public entity lawyer control . . . veto power‟ 
either exist in a contingency fee agreement or are being met in practice?”).  As a “reality 
check” Sullivan goes on to contend that “[l]ast March 12 District Attorney Tony Rackauckas 
announced a „contingency fee‟ agreement with an Orange Country-based law firm to sue 
Toyota” which “[d]espite media and private citizen requests . . . has not been made public” 
on the basis of an opinion by a county attorney “that it is privileged as attorney-client com-
munication.”  Id.  
  80.  See Kelley Brief,  supra note 32 (arguing that  the Memorandum  Agreement 
between the Attorney General‟s office and private contingent fee lawyers including Dickie 
Scrugg specifically provides that “the Attorney General retains control over all aspects of the 
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cases  by  examining  the  differing  litigation  strategies  in  two actions  that 
were filed against gun manufacturers within two weeks of each other: one 
by the City of New Orleans, which chose to retain the same plaintiffs‟ law-
yers who litigated the Tobacco cases as substitute attorneys general, and the 
second filed by the City of Chicago, which relied on a combination of pub-
lic lawyers and private attorneys working either on an hourly basis or pro 
bono to pursue their claims.
81  In the former case, New Orleans pursued a 
strategy of characterizing firearms as “defective products” that was similar 
in many ways to the theories these same lawyers had successfully put for-
ward in the Tobacco cases.  In Chicago, on the other hand, the City pressed 
a theory that emphasized the threat that guns posed to public safety, particu-
larly in inner city neighborhoods.  As Erichson argues, the “tort law” ap-
proach taken by New Orleans was far more likely to lead to a big damage 
award than the “law enforcement” theory pursued by the lawyers in Chica-
go, which more naturally fit with obtaining injunctive or other forms of 
equitable relief.
82  This “investment mentality” on the part of private tort 
lawyers in which they are motivated primarily by their desire to recoup the 
money and time that they have sunk into the case, Erichson concludes, will 
produce decisions that “do not always correspond to the decisions that gov-
ernment officials would make as a matter of policy or politics.”
83  The fact 
that many of the gun cases where traditional mass-tort plaintiffs‟ lawyers 
were brought in to act as substitute attorneys general were quickly dropped 
when these lawyers realized that they would be far more difficult and costly 
to litigate than they first anticipated provides support for this conclusion.
84 
Nevertheless, these concerns seem overblown —or at the very least, 
subject to workable amelioration, albeit not a complete solution.  Although 
defendants cannot be privy to every conversation between public and pri-
vate lawyers to ensure that the latter are appropriately supervised by the 
former, courts can and should require that the documents that grant private 
attorneys the right to act as substitute counsel be made available to opposing 
parties—and to the public at large.  Such “Sunshine Act” procedures, par-
ticularly when accompanied by competitive bidding or other similarly open 
selection processes, will go a long way toward ensuring that public entities 
   
  81.  See Erichson, supra note 27, at 134-38 (describing both cases). 
  82.  Id. at 147 (arguing that “[p]rivate lawyers naturally bring a mass tort/product 
liability  orientation,  whereas  public  lawyers  are  more  likely  to  bring  a  law  enforcement 
orientation”).  The risk of this kind of divergence is likely to be particularly acute in cases 
like the Gun Litigation which have a clearly defined “law enforcement” component.  This 
component is likely to be less present in many consumer cases where the state‟s primary 
interest is in compensation.   
  83.  Id.  
  84.  See id. at 140 (describing lawsuits in Boston and Cincinnati brought by tradi-
tional mass tort lawyers that were voluntarily dismissed after it became clear that they would 
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have at least formally instituted the kind of procedures set out by the court 
in Santa Clara, as well as providing an important bulwark against the pay-
to-play corruption that has sometimes infected the decision to hire counsel 
in the first instance.
85  As the Santa Clara court acknowledged, at present 
these safeguards have not been implemented in many cases.
86  But the mo-
mentum is moving in this direction, fueled by decisions like  Santa Clara 
and scandals like the one involving Dickey Scruggs.   
Consider, for example, the contract between the state of Nevada and 
the law firm of Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll authorizing the latter to act 
as special attorneys general in a law suit filed by the state against several 
mortgage lenders for engaging in various forms of deceptive and fraudulent 
lending practices that caused substantial harm to Nevada residents.
87  The 
document, which was entered into before the court‟s decision in Santa Cla-
ra, expressly covers every area the court identified in that case and a great 
deal more.  Thus, with respect to decision-making authority over the prose-
cution of the litigation, the contract provides that “[i]t is expressly unders-
tood that the Attorney General will have final and exclusive authority over 
all aspects of this case, including settlement decisions” and that she may 
“settle all or part of the related Litigation over the objection” of Cohen 
Milstein.
88  Moreover, the law firm is required to discuss wi th the Attorney 
General “all major litigation decisions” such as which defendants to name 
and what claims to pursue, and to obtain her “written approval” before “tak-
ing any positions that could potentially impact policy concerns of the State” 
and to provide her “with drafts of any court filings sufficiently in advance of 
filing the documents in order for the Attorney General to review the filings 
   
  85.  Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is 
the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 
685, 699 (2000) (advocating in favor of this kind of approach).   
  86.  235 P.3d 21, 40-41 (Cal. 2010) (acknowledging that only five of the ten fee 
agreements  at  issue  contained  an  express  acknowledgement  that  public  officials retained 
“final authority over all aspects of the litigation” and that none of the contracts contained 
sufficient detail to meet the court‟s new standard).  As a result, the court remanded all ten 
cases back to the court of appeals to oversee the drafting of contracts consistent with the 
court‟s opinion.  Id. at 40. 
  87.  Exhibit A to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
Contingency Fee Professional Services Agreement, Lennar Corp. v. Cortez-Masto, No. 1:10-
cv-00378-HHK, (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Fee Agreement] (pleading on file with 
the  author).    I  am  grateful  to  Joseph  Sellers,  Betsy  Miller,  and  Linda  Singer  of  Cohen 
Millstein for bringing this case to my attention and sharing these public documents with me. 
  88.  Id. § 1.1.  There is one exception to the Attorney General‟s plenary authority in 
this area that bears mentioning.  In the event of a settlement “for injunctive relief only” the 
contract provides that Cohen and Milstein will receive “costs and hourly fees at fair market 
value of their legal services expended on behalf of the state.”  Id. § 3.5.4.  “In such an event,” 
the contract continues, “the State agrees not to settle the case unless the defendant agrees to 
pay said amount.”  Id.  I return to the significance of this exception in Part IV. 444  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
and provide comments, unless the Attorney General affirmatively waives 
such review.”
89   
To be sure, no contract  provision is self executing—let alone self-
enforcing.  But the fact that both the Attorney General and Cohen Milstein 
have publicly and explicitly specified their respective rights and duties pro-
vides the well-funded defendants in this case a record on which to hold 
these parties accountable for whether they are living up to their commit-
ments.  Although the attorney-client and work product privileges may shield 
the substance of the conversations that the Attorney General has with her 
substitute counsel, it should not block inquiry into whether the procedural 
terms  relating  to  notice  and  decision  making  authority  specified  in  the 
agreement are being honored.  Indeed, the contract specifically states that 
government attorneys “will be actively involved in all stages of this matter 
and deciding all major issues, including whether to file suit, when to file 
suit, who to file suit against, approval of the asserted claim or claims and 
whether and on what basis to settle or proceed to trial.”
90  Moreover, as the 
Santa Clara court made clear, defendants must be afforded direct access to 
government lawyers, providing a potent weapon to ensure that public law-
yers are actually in control of the case.
91  The fact that defendants in this 
case have filed a motion to disqualify Cohen Milstein in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia indicates that they are certainly capable of tr y-
ing to protect their rights in this manner. 
Finally, any award of attorney‟s fees to Cohen Milstein must be ap-
proved by the court.
92  Although this provision does not make the firm‟s fee 
agreement with the state any less “contingent,”
93 it does provide an addi-
tional level of review for a defendant who believes that the firm—or the 
Attorney General‟s office—has abused its respective authority.  Needless to 
say, court supervision of fee awards in other contexts suggests that simply 
requiring  judicial  approval  is  no  guarantee  against  abuse.    Nevertheless, 
defendants  are  given  ample  opportunities  to  raise  any  objections—and 
   
  89.  Id. §§ 1.1-.2. 
  90.  Id. § 8.1; see also §§ 1.1, 9. 
  91.  235 P.2d at 39-40 (“[R]etention agreements between public entities and private 
counsel . . . must specify that any defendant that is the subject of such litigation may contact 
the lead government attorneys directly, without having to confer with contingent-fee coun-
sel.”).  
  92.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, § 3.2 (“The reasonableness of the attorney‟s fees 
must be approved by the court.”). 
  93.  Under  a  provision  labeled  “Contingency”  the  agreement  expressly  provides: 
“Neither the Attorney General nor the State is liable under this Contract to pay compensation 
to Contractor, other than from monies which may be paid to the State or its agencies party to 
the Litigation, whether by settlement or judgment, from any entities named as defendants in 
the Litigation.”  Id. § 3.1. Summer]  Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction  445 
courts appear to be increasingly scrutinizing fee arrangements,
94 presumably 
sensitive to a range of impermissible arrangements and abuse, including 
“sweetheart” deals for plaintiffs‟ attorneys. 
Indeed, a more open process is likely to affect the kind of lawyers who 
are hired as substitute attorneys general in the first instance.  As critics point 
out, the potential for conflicts of interest between the “investment mentali-
ty” of private lawyers and the public goals that ought to guide litigation on 
behalf of the state are likely to be most severe when the state engages the 
kind of mass-tort lawyers who brought the Tobacco cases and who are now 
searching for new causes of actions in which to invest their war chests.
95  
Even with respect to these lawyers, however, the story turns out to  be more 
complicated than this simple caricature would suggest.  As Howard Eric h-
son documents in his excellent study of the litigation against the gun indus-
try, even some of the traditional plaintiffs‟ lawyers who moved from tobac-
co to guns were motivated in part by a sincere belief that handguns “were 
dangerous products, causing widespread harm that imposed costs not only 
on individuals but also on society as a whole.”
96  As a result, Erichson ar-
gues, these lawyers expended far more time, energy, and most importantly 
money on attempting to hold the industry responsible for these harms than 
would have been warranted by a simple economic calculus of the likely 
return on their investment.
97  Moreover, precisely because of the high profile 
nature of the Gun Litiga tion, the traditional plaintiffs‟ lawyers who were 
deputized  by  state  attorneys  general  to  litigate  these  cases  increasingly 
found themselves working alongside public interest lawyers whose primary 
interest  was  in  reducing  gun  violence  rather  than  in  maximizing  fees.
98  
These lawyers, Erichson concedes, provided a partial check on the extent to 
which the investment decisions of the traditional mass tort lawyers shaped 
the litigation.
99 
   
  94.  See, e.g., Hall v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 07-5325, 2010 WL 4053547, *16 
(D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2010) (“[T]he district court should „engage in robust assessments of the fee 
award reasonableness factors recognizing an especially acute need for close judicial scrutiny 
of fee arrangements in class action settlements.‟”) (quoting In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 
166 (3rd Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted)). 
  95.  Redish, supra note 53, at 7-8 (discussing this motivation). 
  96.  Erichson, supra note 27, at 136 (describing the motivations of Wendell Gauthier, 
the substitute attorney general hired by New Orleans and one of the principal architects of 
the gun litigation nationally). 
  97.  Id. at 145-46 (arguing that it is difficult to explain the gun litigation in simple 
“entrepreneurial terms” and that Gauthier continued to fight the case long after it was clear 
that there was no “pot of gold” at the end even if the case was successful). 
  98.  See id. at 139. 
  99.  Once again, this is partially a function of the unique nature of the public safety 
issues presented in the Gun Litigation.  The fact that several law professors and public inter-
est organizations filed amicus briefs in support of allowing city and county governments to 
engage private contingent fee lawyers in the Lead Paint litigation at issue in Santa Clara, 
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In recent years, however, states and municipalities appear to be turn-
ing to a different kind of law firm to represent their interests in cases against 
corporate defendants.  In  Santa Clara and the Nevada mortgage lending 
cases, for example, traditional mass-tort law firms like Motley Rice and 
Thornton & Naumes (both of which were prominent in the Asbestos and 
Tobacco litigation) are being joined—or replaced—by law firms like Cohen 
Milstein and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy that expressly hold themselves out 
as embracing a strong social justice mission.
100  Although all plaintiffs‟ law 
firms claim to “seek justice,” for the most part these claims are cast solely in 
terms of obtaining compensation for victims through personal injury and 
mass-tort litigation.
101  Firms such as Cohen Milstein and Cotchett, Pitre & 
McCarthy, by contrast, are  organized around a broader social justice mi s-
sion that is reflected in the areas in which they practice,
102 their significant 
commitment to pro bono,
103 and in the backgrounds and commitments of 
   
however,  suggests  that  the  close  working  relationship  between  these  substitute  attorneys 
general and the public interest bar is not unique to the Gun Litigation. 
  100.  This mission is prominently reflected on each firm‟s website.  See, e.g., COHEN 
MILSTEIN,  http://www.cmht.com/home.php  (last  visited  Oct.  20,  2010)  (titling  their  site 
“Access to Justice” and prominently featuring a quote from Corporate Legal Times touting 
the firm as “[t]he most effective law firm in the United States for lawsuits with a strong 
social  and  political  component”  at  the  top  of  their  home  page);  COTCHETT,  PITRE  & 
MCCARTHY,  http://www.cpmlegal.com/  (last  visited  Oct.  20,  2010)  (stating  in  the  firm‟s 
initial website paragraph that “[t]he firm‟s dedication to prosecuting or defending socially 
just actions has earned it both a national and statewide reputation”).  
  101.  See,  e.g.,  Firm  Profile,  MOTLEY  RICE,  http://www.motleyrice.com/info/firm-
profile (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (noting that “Motley Rice seeks justice and accountability 
on behalf of people and institutions harmed by wrongdoing and negligence” and touting its 
extensive experience in litigating cases involving occupational disease and workers rights in 
cases like asbestos and tobacco). 
  102.  Although both Cohen Milstein and Motley Rice claim to specialize in securities 
and consumer fraud, Cohen Milstein has a strong presence in civil rights and human rights 
litigation, whereas Motley Rice‟s expertise lies primarily in traditional tort law areas such as 
product liability, medical malpractice, and catastrophic disasters such as airplane crashes and 
environmental lawsuits such as the BP Oil Spill.  Compare COHEN MILSTEN, supra note 100, 
with MOTLEY RICE, supra note 101. 
  103.  Cohen Milstein‟s website features a home page link to its Pro Bono activities 
listing numerous awards for the firm‟s pro bono work on high profile cases, including seek-
ing compensation from the 9/11 fund and law suits on behalf of Holocaust survivors against 
Swiss banks.  Pro Bono, COHN MILSTEIN, http://www.cmht.com/probono.php (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2010) (leading with a quote from Kenneth Feinberg saying that the firm is “willing 
to dig into their pockets and do whatever is necessary for their clients”).  Motley Rice, on the 
other hand, has no link for Pro Bono on its site but instead has a link describing its contribu-
tions to “local, national, and international non-profit organizations that work to strengthen 
our  communities  and  enhance  the  quality  of  life  for  others.”    Community  Connections, 
MOTLEY RICE, http://www.motleyrice.com/info/community-connections (last visited Jan. 8, 
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their lawyers.
104   
These differences are reflected in the manner i n which the two kinds 
of firms organize their representation of state and local clients.  Cohen Mils-
tein has a dedicated “Public Clients” practice group headed by the former 
Attorney General for the District of Columbia.
105  Although Motley Rice 
also has extensive experience in representing public clients as substitute 
attorneys general, such cases are not listed among the firms special “Case 
Types” on its home page and instead are handled by lawyers such as Joseph 
Rice who lists his representation of twenty-six Attorneys General in the 
Tobacco  Litigation  as  part  of  his  general  expertise  in  handling  complex 
class actions in a range of areas from asbestos to securities fraud.
106 
Needless to say, these differences in structure, orientation, and pe r-
sonnel do not me an that firms like Cohen Milstein will  necessarily dis-
charge  their  role  as  substitute  attorneys  general  in  ways  that  are  better 
aligned with the public responsibilities of their governmental clients than 
more traditional firms such as Motley Rice.  As Derrick Bell reminded us 
long ago, ideological motivations can cloud a lawyer‟s judgment every bit 
as much as financial interests.
107  But it does seem likely that firms that are 
attempting to operate “between profit and principle”
108 will be less likely to 
   
  104.  For example, three of the four named partners at Cohen Milstein spent signifi-
cant time in government or public interest organizations before joining the firm.  Attorneys, 
COHEN  MILSTEIN,  http://www.cmht.com/attorneys.php  (last  visited  Oct.  20, 2010)  (listing 
Jerry S. Cohen (Michigan Attorney General‟s office and Senate Antitrust Committee), Her-
bert E. Milstein (Securities and Exchange Commission), and Joseph Sellers (Equal Oppor-
tunities Commission, Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, and the Washington Law-
yers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law)).  By contrast, neither Motley nor Rice list any 
public sector or public interest experience on their web pages. 
  105.  See Linda Singer, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cmht.com/attorneys.php?People 
ID=59 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (describing Ms. Singer as the head of the Public Client 
practice group and listing her background and credentials).  Ms. Singer is joined in the prac-
tice by Betsy Miller who served as Ms. Singer‟s Chief of Staff and Senior Counsel at the DC 
Attorney  General‟s  office  before  joining  the  firm.    See  Betsy  Miller,  COHEN  MILSTEIN, 
http://www.cmht.com/attorneys.php?PeopleID=6;  see  also  Practice  Areas—Qui  Tam, 
CROCHETT,  PITRIE  &  MCCARTHY,  http://www.cpmlegal.com/practicearea-quitam.php  (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2010) (describing the firm‟s practice in bringing lawsuits by “whistleblow-
ers” on behalf of the state to recover money from corporations that have defrauded the gov-
ernment).  As William Rubenstein argues, lawyers who bring such actions are also properly 
characterized as substitute private attorneys general.  See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2144-
45. 
  106.  Joseph  F.  Rice,  MOTLEY  RICE,  www.motleyrice.com/attorneys/view/joseph-f-
rice (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
  107.  See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).   
  108.  See  Scott  Cummings &  Ann  Southworth, Between Profit  and  Principle:  The 
Private Public Interest Firm, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 186 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather, eds. 
2009)  (describing  “private  public  interest  firms”  as  “organized  as  for-profit  entities,  but 
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approach these cases solely from the “investment mindset” that the critics of 
allowing contingent fees in this area fear, particularly when the lawyers who 
are handling the cases have a deep personal and professional identification 
with the public clients that they are representing.
109  Indeed, to the extent 
that these firms are trying to build sustainable practices in this area, they 
now have an important reputational interest in making sure that the pe r-
ceived gap between what public clients want and what these fi rms are per-
ceived as providing in terms of strategy, direction, and investment does not 
become so great as to threaten their future retention.  As hiring and contract-
ing decisions become more public, both private defendants and ordinary 
citizens will have a greater ability to ensure that neither the substitute attor-
neys general nor the government officials who hire them are trading on this 
reputation for short-term gain. 
This  latter  point  suggests  why  the  second  group  of  objections 
grounded in democratic ac countability and individual rights are also less 
persuasive than they might appear at first blush.  There is certainly some 
truth in Jack Coffee‟s characterization of an attorney general‟s decision to 
hire substitute counsel on a contingent fee basis as a version of “heads, we 
win and the state recovers its losses; tails we lose, but we incur no out-of-
pocket loses and we hired the best people available.”
110  Whether this un-
dermines the legislature‟s authority over spending, however, is far less cer-
tain.  With respect to legislative control, the publicity surrounding both the 
initiation and prosecution of these kinds of cases seems likely to give legis-
latures and public officials plenty of notice and opportunity to express their 
views.  The fact that so many state Attorneys General aspire to higher polit-
ical office gives these officials strong incentives to ensure that cases of this 
kind receive maximum publicity.
111  As even those who worry that hi ring 
contingent fee lawyers may undermine legislative control ove r spending 
   
advancing the public interest is one of their primary purposes—a core mission rather than a 
secondary concern”).  Needless to say, whether Cohen Milstein or Crochett Pitrie fully merit 
this designation is beyond the scope of this inquiry—although the differences cited above 
certainly suggest that these firms are attempting to portray themselves as if they do.  My 
point simply is that state officials can and should look to see whether the law firms that they 
hire as substitute attorneys general have this orientation—and defendants and the public at 
large can and should hold public officials accountable for whether they in fact engage in this 
inquiry.  
  109.  I return to the issue of professional identity below. 
  110.  Coffee, supra note 20, at 251. 
  111.  Indeed,  opponents  criticize  the  fact  that  sitting  attorneys  general  make  such 
frequent use of this bully pulpit because it affords these state officials an unfair advantage on 
the campaign trail.  See Gramlich, supra note 40 (describing how California Attorney Gener-
al and gubernatorial candidate Jerry Brown “spent much of last week making televised pub-
lic appearances to tout the work he is doing as the state‟s top lawyer, including expanding the 
state‟s DNA database and suing the nation‟s two largest mortgage lenders,” all without airing 
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concede, “[i]n high-profile litigation, political incentives may drive litiga-
tion decisions notwithstanding the retention of contingent fee lawyers.”
112   
Indeed, as Jack Coffee argues, such political considerations are likely 
to be dominant regardless of whether the Attorney General hires substitute 
counsel or how they are paid.  Whether or not one believes that politicians 
are solely motivated by some combination of personal gain (whether meas-
ured by money or electoral success) and interest group pressure,
113 no credi-
ble theory of politics claims that these considerations do not play a signif i-
cant role in the decision-making of public officials.  As a result, the primary 
considerations for both Attorneys General and legislatures in deciding 
whether to bring these cases are likely to be political.  Most of the litigation 
that has been filed by states and municipalities in recent years has targeted 
industries—tobacco  companies,  gun  manufacturers,  lead  paint  producers, 
mortgage lenders, HMOs, and most recently BP—that were already quite 
unpopular with a significant part of the population at the time the cases were 
brought.  It is not surprising, therefore, that Attorneys General have decided 
to proceed against these particular defendants, and that several state legisla-
tures have specifically authorized them to do so.
114  Although one can cer-
tainly argue whether cases like this are likely to make good  law, bringing 
such actions appears to be good politics.
   And where it is not good politics, 
the case is likely to have a much shorter half-life.
  
Moreover, while the availability of contingent fees will certainly put a 
thumb on the scale in favor of suing, this incentive also acts as a counter-
weight against the strong incentives that politicians face not to sue such 
powerful private interests.  As Marc Galanter taught us more than forty 
years ago, one of the main reasons that the “have‟s” tend to come out ahead 
in litigation is that they have the ability to “play for the rules” by lobbying 
to create favorable policies or procedures—or just as importantly to block 
unfavorable ones—in a manner that shifts the litigation terrain dramatically 
   
  112.  Erichson, supra note 20, at 40.  Indeed, in light of the political risks associated 
with losing such high profile actions, Attorneys General are unlikely to bring these cases in 
the first place unless they know that they have a very strong case.  The fact that state officials 
are entitled to use their subpoena power to collect important factual information prior to 
bringing suit will further reinforce their tendency to move forward only on cases where there 
is a significant probability of success.  See generally id.  I return to the issue of the govern-
ment‟s subpoena power below.  Notwithstanding these incentives, however, the Gun Litiga-
tion underscores that sometimes public officials will bring actions where there is a relatively 
low chance of success.  See Erichson, supra note 27, at 129-51 (describing the legal and 
factual difficulties encountered by the lawyers who brought the gun cases). 
  113.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
  114.  See  infra  note  117  and  accompanying  text  regarding  states  that  have  passed 
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in their favor.
115  To be sure, the Attorney General is not a typical “one-
shot” litigant.  But neither does he or she have the same ability to influence 
legislation through campaign donations and targeted advertising that tend to 
have the most direct influence on elected representatives.
116  These weapons 
are likely to be particularly potent in the context of an Attorney General‟s 
attempt to procure a specific funding authorization to bring a lawsuit against 
a well-funded and politically connected adversary.  It might be successful in 
a case like BP where there is a strong enough public outcry to make it diffi-
cult for legislators to vote against it, but in many other cases the advantages 
held by industry lobbyists will simply be too great to overcome.
117   
Indeed, this is precisely why courts and legislatures have embraced the 
concept of the “private attorney general”—and more generally “public law 
litigation”—in the first place.  Although as my colleague William Rubens-
tein has argued, there have been a multitude of definitions of and justifica-
tions for these concepts,
118 one important strain is the recognition that there 
will inevitably be some important public interests that are too diffuse to gain 
legislative recognition—particularly when opposed by interests that are both 
concentrated and well financed—and that public officials can and should 
harness private incentives to supplement public enforcement.
119  Thus, the 
complaint that “[b]y the use of contingent fee layers, Attorneys General 
gain an unparalleled ability to determine the size of their own agency budg-
ets”
120 ignores the fact that both Attorneys General and legislatures have 
been using the concept of the private attorney general to expand state en-
forcement resources for more than fifty years.  Although legal doctrines 
   
  115.  See Mark Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC‟Y REV. 95 (1974). See also IN LITIGATION: DO THE 
“HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbet M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003). 
  116.  See Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and 
Tobacco  Litigation,  23  LAW  &  SOC.  INQUIRY  897,  909  (1998)  (noting  that  legal  claims 
against the tobacco industry filed by state governments using private contingent fee lawyers 
were an important means of “overcom[ing] well-known facts about „why the „haves‟ come 
out ahead‟ in litigation”) (citing Galanter, supra note 115). 
  117.  Indeed, the fact that at the time of this writing the legislation authorizing the 
Louisiana Attorney General to hire contingent fee counsel to litigate against BP is still stuck 
in committee suggests just how difficult it is to get authorization from the legislature even in 
cases where the defendant is extremely unpopular and the state is not being asked to appro-
priate funds directly from the public coffer.  See Caldwell‟s Office to Receive Another $5 
Million, supra note 14. 
  118.  Rubenstein, supra note 18. 
  119.  For the classic description of public law litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role 
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).  For a description of 
the widespread use of private attorneys general by both courts and legislatures as an integral 
part of public enforcement, see Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2134-36. 
  120.  Erichson, supra note 20, at 39 n.187 (citing Gale A. Norton, The Long Term 
Implications of Tobacco Litigation 8 (Jan. 8, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
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such as standing may prevent purely private lawyers from bringing the pre-
cise claims that governments have been litigating in this area, as those who 
have filed these suits acknowledge the distance between these public actions 
and the private ones that were already underway was more a matter of form 
than function.
121 
The real question, therefore, is whether the state should expand its en-
forcement resources through the use of substitute attorneys general who are 
specifically deputized for this purpose, or instead rely on what Rubenstein 
calls  supplemental  private  attorneys  general,  who  he  defines  as  “private 
attorneys whose work for private clients contributes to the public interest by 
supplementing  the  government‟s  enforcement  of  laws  and  public  poli-
cies.”
122  Although there are many distinctions between these two roles, one 
of the most important concerns the degree of control that the public attorney 
general is able to exercise over the private one.  Because they are hired di-
rectly by the Attorney General and charged with functioning as if they are 
members of that office, public officials can—and should—exercise substan-
tial control over the actions of private lawyers acting as substitute attorneys 
general.
123  Supplemental attorneys general, who gain their authoriz ation 
from legislation, rules, or judicial decisions, and who work almost e xclu-
sively on their own, are subject to f ar less direct public control.
124  To the 
extent that the criticism we are discussing sounds in democratic accoun ta-
bility, this greater degree of public control should make the former context 
clearly preferable to the latter. 
Of course, as indicated above, t o say that public officials  can  and 
should exercise significant control over substitute attorneys general does not 
mean that they will always be able to do so effectively.  The critics who 
raise  this  issue,  therefore,  have  identified  an  important  issue  that  bears 
   
  121.  See id. at 19-20 (quoting the former Attorney General of Colorado as conceding 
that while “„[i]n a strict legal sense, the state is collecting only its own expenses . . . [i]n a 
less stringent sense, the state is aggregating the claims of its citizens and fulfilling a role 
similar to that of a class action‟”); see also Rubensein, supra note 18, at 2146 (arguing that  
cases like tobacco constitute a “more private-like function[] than those that constitute the 
core of the attorney general‟s work”). 
  122.  Rubenstien, supra note 18, at 2146.  As Rubenstien acknowledges, these two 
kinds of private attorneys general are not perfectly interchangeable since the substitute attor-
ney general can bring claims on behalf of the state that are not available to private parties.  
Id. at 2143-54.  Nevertheless, as indicated above, in many instances at the core of what At-
torneys General are doing in this area, the claims are very similar.   
  123.  I return to the question of whether that control should be plenary, or whether 
there are some areas where these private lawyers should retain autonomy, below. 
  124.  See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2153 (noting that such lawyers are “clearly not 
paid . . . by [the] government” nor expressly “represents” government interests).  This is not 
to say that public officials currently exercise no control over these lawyers—or that they 
should not try to exercise more such control.  Once again, I will return to these matters be-
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watching.
125  Where they err, however, is in assuming that the only context 
in which this issue arises is in situations in which the lawyer is being co m-
pensated on the basis of some form of contingent fee. 
Many of those who have objected the loudest  to the hiring of contin-
gent fee lawyers in this context appear to assume that retaining substitute 
attorneys general on a flat or hourly fee basis, or enlisting the help of atto r-
neys who will assist the state pro bono, is unproblematic.  Indeed, some 
even go on to assert that engaging private lawyers on anything other than a 
contingent fee basis is affirmatively beneficial and should be promoted 
whenever public authorities may need the assistance of the kind of expertise 
or resources that can best be found in the private sector.
126  This view, how-
ever, severely underestimates the potential conflicts of interest and monitor-
ing issues that can —and often do—arise in both of these other contexts.  
Thus, as anyone who has studied the legal profession over the last decade is 
well aware, the very types of large corporations who are being sued in the 
cases we are now discussing have been trying for years to move away from 
compensating their own outside counsel on the basis of hourly fees on the 
ground that it creates a significant incentive for law firms to “run the meter” 
in a way that is not at all in the interests of their clients.
127  Although com-
panies have been attempting to cabin this practice for years through ex ante 
instructions, detailed monitoring of work in p rogress, and ex post review, 
many contend that the problem of overcharging and unnecessary work pers-
ists.
128  It is hard to imagine that public authorities who possess both far 
fewer resources—which, of course, is one of the primary reasons for hiring 
substitute attorneys general in the first place—and who have far less expe-
rience monitoring outside counsel are likely to do a better job.  Certainly, 
the history of government contracting generally provides little indication 
   
  125.  The fact that a recent “primer” commissioned by the US Chamber of Commerce  
on defending cases filed by state Attorneys General could not cite to a single instance in 
which a court had upheld this kind of due process claim, however, suggests that at least to 
date  there  is  no  direct  evidence  that  these  legitimate  concerns  have  materialized.    See 
DICKSTEIN  SHAPIRO  LLP,  BEYOND  DUE  PROCESS—A  LITIGATION  PRIMER:  CHALLENGING 
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS (Jan. 2009) 
(acknowledging that “courts largely have rejected the argument that government contingency 
fee arrangements are fundamentally at odds with due process”) (on file with author). 
  126.  See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 20 at 35-36 (arguing that “[w]hen private lawyers 
are hired by the government on an hourly or flat fee, it raises typical outsourcing issues, but 
need not present major problems of government legal policy” and “[n]or does the govern-
ment‟s use of pro bono lawyers”); see also Redish, supra note 53, at 5. 
  127.  See, e.g., JERRY CUSTIS, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 5:14 (2009) 
(stating that in-house counsel have voiced “[m]any . . . criticisms of hourly pricing,” includ-
ing “considerable suspicion that the hourly system encouraged overworking of cases, the 
assignment of too many lawyers to cases and the spending of time on unimportant or useless 
tasks,” with “no incentive to spend less rather than more time to accomplish tasks”). 
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that public oversight will be particularly effective in this area.
129  Moreover, 
although flat fees arguably correct for some of these negative incentives, 
they increase the danger of others, particularly shirking and other forms of 
underinvestment.
130  Once again, it seems doubtful that public  authorities 
will be better at detecting and preventing such conduct than their counte r-
parts in the general counsels‟ offices of major companies. 
The Treasury Department‟s recent decision to retain thirteen of the 
country‟s largest and most prestigious outside law firms to help run the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program at a potential cost of over $100 million 
underscores just how many of the same issues that arise when substitute 
counsel are hired on a contingent fee basis are likely to be equally present 
when the retainer is by the hour.
131  Notwithstanding the fact that Treasury 
has almost 2,000 lawyers —making it the equivalent of the fourth largest 
law firm in the country—the agency has decided it needs outside counsel to 
assist it with the complex and specialized work that TARP requires.  Al-
though Treasury claims that it selected counsel on the basis of a comprehen-
sive bidding process in which the firms had to agree to detailed oversight 
and evaluation by government officials, both the process itself and the exact 
terms on which the firms are being hired have not been disclosed—even to 
the Congressional Oversight Panel that is supposed to oversee the TARP 
program.
132  Even the billing rates that the firms will be charging the go v-
ernment for their services “are considered proprietary and will not be pro-
vided.”
133  Given that these rates are almost certainly many hundreds of dol-
lars an hour—and that the total fees will certainly run into the tens of mil-
lions—it  is  hard  to  imagine  a  less  democratically  accountable  process.  
Clearly, the hourly fee contract in TARP is far less transparent than the con-
tingency fee contract entered into between the State of Nevada and Cohen 
Milstein discussed above.
134 
   
  129.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1317 (2003) (noting that governmental agencies are “generally ill-
equipped” to “extensive[ly] monitor[] private contractors . . . not only for cost control and 
fraud prevention purposes, but also for quality control, which these agencies charged with 
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  130.  See, e.g., Wendy Leibowitz, Getting Paid: Is There A Light at the Bottom of the 
Stack of Bills?, 30 L. PRAC. MGMT., May/June 2004, at 22, 22 (describing problems with 
various legal billing procedures, including “flat fee” arrangements). 
  131.  See Jenna Greene, Cadwalader Biggest Beneficiary as Treasury Adds Firms to 
Help  Run  TARP,  NAT‟L  L.J.,  Oct.  4,  2010,  available  at  http://www.law.com/jsp/article. 
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  132.  Id. 
  133.  Id. 
  134.  See Fee Agreement, supra note 87, § 3.3 (specifying in detail the exact percen-
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Nor is pro bono representation as free from conflict as the critics of 
contingent fees in this context appear to believe.  As Scott Cummings de-
monstrates,  law  firms  are  increasingly  viewing  pro  bono  representation 
through the lens of their broader business and strategic interests.
135  As a 
result, these firms are hesitant to parti cipate in any pro bono matter that is 
likely to upset their current clients —or conflict them out of representing 
future ones.  Given these incentives, it is one thing to find a law firm that is 
prepared to assist in litigation against gun manufacturers.
136  It is quite a 
different matter to find a firm that would be willing to play a significant role 
in a similar action against mortgage lenders or HMOs.  The list of prom i-
nent law firms defending lead paint manufacturers cited above suggests that 
there will be relatively few firms willing to jeopardize their current or future 
business prospects with these kinds of potentially lucrative clients.   
Moreover, even if an Attorney General can find a firm willing to take 
one of these cases on a pro bono basis, he or she will still have to pay care-
ful attention to ensure that the case is being handled properly.  Pro bono 
cases are often treated as second-class work in many large law firms.  The 
cases tend to be staffed primarily by associates as opposed to partners, an d 
there is a constant danger that the work will be put on the back burner if the 
lawyer‟s paying cases heat up.  Nor are the lawyers who volunteer to work 
on these cases likely to be experts in the particular substantive or procedural 
issues in question.  To the contrary, firms tend to use pro bono cases as 
“training vehicles” for young lawyers to gain the kind of experience that 
their paying clients are increasingly less willing to pay for.  As many a pub-
lic interest organization has discovered, getting these novices up to speed 
and making sure that they are working competently and effectively takes a 
considerable amount of time by the “real” lawyers that these organizations 
employ full-time.
137   
Finally, lawyers who litigate cases pro bono sometimes appear  to be-
lieve that they are—or at least ought to be—less bound by their clients‟ di-
rection  and  control  than would  be the  case in  a fee-for-service relation-
ship.
138  Needless to say, few would admit to such a view.  Nevertheless, the 
   
  135.  See generally Cummings, supra note 12, at 33-41. 
  136.  Even here, it would be interesting to know how many law firms the City of 
Chicago asked before finding the ones who agreed to undertake that case—or whether these 
same firms would do so today. 
  137.  See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing 
Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2426-27 (2010). 
  138.  I  discuss  this  possibility  in  David  B.  Wilkins,  Race,  Ethics,  and  the  First 
Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
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fact that pro bono lawyers “donate”
139 their services, and that working on 
these cases is often touted as giving lawyers an opportunity to express their 
own interests and commitments in ways that they often do not feel they can 
do in their paying work, seems likely to promote a feeling of entitlement 
with respect to influencing the goals to which one‟s efforts are being di-
rected, at least at a subconscious level.
140  Once again, state officials will 
have to monitor for this kind of potential personal or ideological bias when 
they engage pro bono counsel. 
None of this should be taken to suggest that state officials are likely to 
encounter  more  problems  when  they  engage  substitute  private  attorneys 
general on the basis of hourly fees or pro bono representation than they are 
likely to confront when they proceed—as they have in most cases—to retain 
such counsel on a contingent fee basis.  My point simply is that the distance 
between these two states of affairs is far less great than the critics of contin-
gent fees in this context suggest. 
More generally, my point is that the kind of issues that those who have 
been critical of the trend toward bringing in private contingent fee lawyers 
to represent public entities suing private companies are likely to be present 
in any situation in which private and public lawyering roles are intermin-
gled.  As I indicated at the beginning of this Essay, this blurring of bounda-
ries between public and private is becoming increasingly common in the 
legal profession.  I conclude by making a few observations about what the 
case of the substitute attorneys general can teach us about this more general 
phenomenon.   
IV.  TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAWYER 
At one level, the case of the private lawyer hired to be a substitute pri-
vate attorney general might appear to be one of the simplest to resolve from 
the perspective of sorting through a lawyer‟s public and private responsibili-
ties.  After all, both supporters and critics alike agree that these lawyers are 
intended to be indistinguishable from their public counterparts.
141  The only 
   
  139.  As a partner once reminded me, this characterization is somewhat disingenuous 
since in most instances the lawyers who are working on these cases are still being paid by the 
firm to take on this work.  As he said with a shrug: “It‟s pro bono for us not for them!” 
  140.  See generally William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A 
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1099 (1994) (noting that public interest lawyers will inevitably exert such control but 
arguing that in the end it is the right thing to do). 
  141.  Compare Redish, supra note 53, at 17 (arguing that “when government dele-
gates the power to litigate claims on the government‟s behalf  to private attorneys, those 
attorneys are subject to the exact same ethical and political limitations as are full time gov-
ernment attorneys”), with Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2143 (describing substitute attorneys 
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relevant question, therefore, would seem to be how to ensure that the private 
lawyers who assume these roles carry out their duties in a manner that is 
fully consistent with the directions of their public lawyer bosses.  As we 
have already seen, however, this simple characterization misses much of the 
complexity that is actually going on in these relationships.  As noted above, 
many of the criticisms about the hiring of contingent fee lawyers in this 
setting seem to bemoan the fact that these agents might carry out their prin-
ciple‟s wishes too well by helping Attorneys General achieve highly public 
victories against unpopular companies in order to further their own political 
gain.  Although one might reasonably complain that such actions are not in 
“the public interest,” the fact that publicly elected Attorneys General are 
likely to see it otherwise suggests that the real problem is not one of agency 
but instead lies with how the principal is defining his or her public responsi-
bilities to the private parties that are affected by the exercise of state power. 
As Howard Erichson  demonstrates, this is a pervasive problem in a 
world in which the actions that public officials take with respect to these 
cases will have implications that reach far beyond the contours of whatever 
litigation the state chooses to bring.  Given the near certainty that any gov-
ernment lawsuit will produce what Erichson calls “coattail class actions” by 
private parties, he argues that public lawyers should have an obligation to 
consider these secondary effects when deciding whether and on what terms 
to settle their initial litigation.
142  Specifically, Erichson argues that govern-
ment lawyers should consider the benefit that private plaintiffs receive from 
both issue preclusion and access to discovery materials before agreeing to a 
settlement that would deprive future plaintiffs from the benefit of either.
143  
But as others would surely argue (and as Erichson himself points out in 
another part of the same article), the defendants are also part of the “public” 
the government lawyer represents.  As a result, government lawyers should 
also consider whether giving private plaintiffs the benefit of issue preclu-
sion  and the  public  disclosure  of  discovery  material  will  result  in  over-
deterrence rather than prevent under-deterrence. 
Similarly, the private lawyers who are engaged as substitute attorneys 
general are also likely to have complexly dual commitments—regardless of 
whether they are retained on an hourly or a contingent fee basis.  It is tempt-
ing, as William Rubenstein notes, to think of these temporary public law-
yers as performing their public and private roles sequentially, as Rubenstein 
puts it, “private one day, public the next.”
144  But this characterization ig-
nores the fact that most of the lawyers hired in this position will continue to 
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indicated above, Redish is far more critical of this practice than Rubenstein. 
  142.  Erichson, supra note 20, at 27-35. 
  143.  Id. at 29-30. 
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represent private clients at the same time that they are doing the people‟s 
work—and if the lawyer herself does not, then other members of her firm 
surely will.  As a result, these lawyers (or law firms) will be called upon to 
balance their public and private responsibilities simultaneously as well as 
sequentially (both before and after their time as a substitute attorneys gener-
al is over).
145   
This duality creates a significant potential for conflicts of interest.  In 
the TARP case, for example, many of the firms hired by the Treasury D e-
partment also represent TARP recipients.
146  Indeed, the firm receiving the 
lion‟s share of the work—New York‟s Cadwalader, Wikersham & Taft—
was widely regarded as one of the leading firms in the country in handling 
the  very  credit  default  swaps,  collateralized  debt  obligations,  and  other 
complex financial products that are now being blamed for the collapse.
147  
Not surprisingly, this duality does not sit well with many  observers.  Thus 
the Congressional Panel Overseeing TARP asked Cadwalader to disclose its 
client relationships with TARP recipients so that it could assess the co n-
flict.
148  Cadwalader and the Treasury Department refused to do so.  Instead, 
both the government and the firm emphasized that Cadwalader was required 
to  provide Treasury  with a  detailed  “conflict-of-interest  mitigation  plan” 
that  identified  “actual,  potential  or  apparent  organizational  and  personal 
conflicts of interest as part of its proposal.”
149  A senior representative of the 
firm assured an interviewer that while Cadwalader “has represented TARP 
recipients on unrelated matters,” it “would never represent someone directly 
in connection with TARP funds” since doing so “would be antithetical to 
our engagement agreement.”
150   
Needless to say, one can certainly be skeptical about such promises—
especially since neither the firm nor Treasury was willing to make the exact 
terms of the engagement public. But even if one is willing to credit the fact 
that Cadwalader will not represent a TARP recipient in a matter that is “di-
rectly  adverse”  to  the  firm‟s  duties  as  substitute  attorney  general  while 
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  146.  Greene, supra note 131 (reporting this fact).  
  147.  See Stuart Goldstein & Angus Duncan, The Developing Global Market for CRE 
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  149.  Id.  
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representing the government, this important restriction does not exhaust the 
potential for conflict. As a member of the Congressional Oversight Commit-
tee  accurately  observed,  “TARP  recipients  are  going  to  be  these  firms‟ 
clients forever and TARP is going to go away.”
151  The sequential pull of 
these past loyalties, or the prospect of gaining lucrative business in the fu-
ture—or both—may cloud the judgment of lawyers at these firms even in 
the absence of any current direct conflict.
152 
This is not to say that the Treasury Department should not hire Ca d-
walader or any other firm that has, or might in the future, represent TAR P 
recipients.  As a lawyer for another firm that will be part of the Treasury‟s 
program conceded, a strict rule prohibiting any such conflicts would mean 
that “[e]very law firm that‟s ever represented a bank would have a prob-
lem.”
153  Given the complexity of the issues that the government is confront-
ing in TARP, it would be counterproductive to prevent Treasury from avail-
ing itself of the very representatives most likely to know how to get the job 
done effectively and efficiently.  Indeed, given the rules of vicarious disqua-
lification and the increasing mobility of lawyers both between the public 
and private sectors and among major law firms, the problem of finding a 
conflict-free lawyer or firm in this area with the relevant experience that the 
government needs could be insurmountable.
154 
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conflict on the ground that it resigned from representing the union before undertaking the 
current public representation.  See Nevada Attorney General‟s Motion to Dismiss Lennar‟s 
First Amended Complaint at 27, Lennar Corp. v. Cortez-Masto, No. 1:10-cv-00378-HHK, 
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing an acknowledgement by Lennar that the firm withdrew from 
representing the union several months before the complaint was filed and therefore “dual 
representation is not occurring and, in fact, never occurred”).  As indicated above even if 
correct, this does not entirely resolve the potential conflict. 
  153.  Greene, supra note 131 (quoting a partner at Haynes & Boone). 
  154.  See Gina Passarella, Government Lawyers Sought After as Law Firm Laterals, 
LEGAL  INTELLIGENCER,  Oct.  4,  2010,  available  at,  http://www.law.com/jsp/article 
.jsp?id=1202472833973  (last  visited  Oct.  20,  2010)  (reporting  that  “[i]n  a  lateral  market 
where books of business typically reign supreme, some law firms have found hiring from the 
public sector can create business in other ways”).  With respect to the rules of vicarious 
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The question, therefore, is not how to find a “pure” private lawyer 
who can serve the public interest free from any potential conflict, but rather 
how to define the responsibilities of lawyers who are exercising an increa-
singly complex mix of public and private duties both simultaneously and 
sequentially.  The answer to this question is likely to lie partly in the realm 
of institutional design.  What are the proper checks and balances to insure 
that private lawyers who are hired as substitute attorneys general, either on a 
contingent fee as is typically happening at the state level, or on an hourly 
fee basis as is increasingly prevalent in programs like TARP, serve the pub-
lic interest when carrying out their official duties and do not use information 
or other resources that they obtained in their official capacity to unfairly 
disadvantage some citizens or advantage others once they return to their 
“private” practices?  Should the private lawyers who serve in this public 
capacity be viewed as independent contractors whose rights and obligations 
are primarily a matter of contract?  Or should they be considered quasi em-
ployees who are subject to the same rules of ethics and conflicts of interest 
as the public officials for whom they act as surrogates?
155 Engaging with 
scholars who think about the proper design and fun ctioning of public insti-
tutions will be essential to answering these and other perplexing que s-
tions.
156  Given the enormous expansion in the use of go vernment contrac-
tors and  other similar means of providing public services through private 
parties,
157 this is a conversation that needs to begin immediately. 
   
disqualification, see MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2009) (describing the rules 
governing  lawyers  moving  from  one  private law  firm  to  another)  and  MODEL  RULES  OF 
PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (describing the rules applicable to lawyers moving in and out of 
government).  I return to the shrinking difference between these two rules below. 
  155.  See Clark, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that “[m]ost of the ethics statutes and 
rules  that  regulate  government  employee  ethics  do  not  apply  to    contractor  personnel”).  
Indeed, as Clark notes in another piece, TARP differentiates between the fiduciary and dis-
closure obligations of law firms such as Cadwalader, which are classified as “contractors,” 
and “fiduciary agents” that TARP hires to manage its assets, who are expressly required to 
“agree[] to act at all times in the best interests of the United States.” Kathleen Clark, Fidu-
ciary-Based Standards for Bailout Contractors: What Treasury Got Right and Wrong in 
TARP (Feb. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author), at 8.  For an excellent 
discussion  about  the  increasingly  complex  relationship  between  the  public  and  private 
spheres,  see  MARTHA  MINOW,  PARTNERS,  NOT  RIVALS:  PRIVATIZATION  AND  THE  PUBLIC 
GOOD (2002). 
  156.  For a thoughtful analysis that attempts to begin a conversation between those 
who study professions and theorists of public institutions in a related context, see Adrian 
Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file  with  author  and  available  at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1646414) (linking the professional literature on second opinions with a political theory anal-
ysis of the design of public institutions). 
  157.  Kathleen Clark estimates that between 1983 and 2007, the amount of govern-
ment service contracting grew by 85% in constant dollars from $70 billion to $130 billion 
($268 billion in today‟s terms).  Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest In and Out of 
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In the last analysis, however, addressing this new reality is likely to be 
as much a matter of ethics and identity as structures and rules.  As William 
Rubenstein concludes, we must first determine how much a given private 
attorney general should be “an agent for public ends, in addition to private 
ones” before we can determine the “rules by which we should enable (and 
constrain) her and the fees with which we should reward her.”
158   
Ironically,  the  legal  profession  used  to  have  a  fairly  simple  and 
straightforward way of thinking about this question.  Lawyers, according to 
this traditional view, are simultaneously and indivisibly both zealous advo-
cates for the interests of their private clients and officers of the legal system 
with a special obligation to protect democratic values and the rule of law.
159  
Given  this  ethos,  it  is  not  surprising  that  elite  lawyers  in  the  “Golden 
Age”
160 of the large law firm in the middle decades of the twentieth century 
drew relatively little distinction between their work for private clients and 
their occasional service in the public arena.  As Erwin Smigel reported in 
his study of Wall Street lawyers in the 1960s:   
Such partnerships are likely in the future, as they have in the past, to prepare and 
offer for public service men exceptionally qualified to serve.  The very nature of 
such a partnership permits a man to do more, not less civic work, and permits him, 
as a true officer of the court and a responsible citizen, more readily to enter public 
service for various periods and to serve society to his full professional capacity.
161 
Today, such confident pronouncements about the seamless and mu-
tually reinforcing connection between private practice and public service 
ring hollow against the backdrop of the increasingly competitive and cutth-
roat global market for legal services.  There is a widespread feeling among 
younger and older lawyers alike that the once interconnected worlds of pri-
vate practice and public service have grown increasingly distant from each 
   
Government (Feb. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author forthcoming in 
the Alabama Law Review), at 9-10.   
  158.  Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 2173.  Rubenstein uses a distinctly personal analo-
gy to drive this point home.  Id. at 2172 (analogizing the mix of public and private duties of 
various private attorneys general to the mix of heterosexual and homosexual impulses that 
make up an individual‟s unique sexuality).   
  159.  I elaborate this traditional claim in David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Law-
yers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470-71 (1990). 
  160.  As Marc Galanter has been quick to remind us, these often celebrated days were 
not particularly “golden” for the many groups who were excluded from law firms—or indeed 
the legal profession altogether.  See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of 
Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996).  For my own take on this kind of golden age 
rhetoric, see David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals 
from  Ideology  in  Legal  Ethics,  108  HARV.  L.  REV.  458  (1994)  (reviewing  ANTHONY  T. 
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS  OF  THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995), which 
makes several approving references to the golden age). 
  161.  ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL 
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other, with lawyers and even law students forced to stake their claim to one 
or the other realm at an ever earlier time.
162  And yet, the series of connected 
trends discussed at the outset of this Essay point to a more complex reality.  
Public and private roles are arguably more inextricably intertwined than 
they have been at any other time in the profession‟s history.  Although it is 
unlikely that the profession could ever recreate the ethic of seamless inte-
gration that it purported to maintain during the “Golden Age”
163—and it is 
far from clear that it would be desirable to do so even if turning back the 
clock in this fashion were indeed possible—it does seem necessary to move 
away from the current understanding that tends to separate public and pri-
vate interests into distinct and largely insular camps.   
As I said at the outset, defining exactly what such an ethic would look 
like is far beyond the scope of this Essay.  Nevertheless, the above analysis 
suggests three dimensions along which the task of articulating a new syn-
thesis should proceed.  First, at a minimum lawyers need to be taught to 
recognize and appreciate the various public and private dimensions of their 
particular roles.  This process must go beyond the “Golden Age‟s” simple 
sloganeering that a lawyer is always and indivisibly an “advocate” for the 
private interests of clients and an “officer of the court” responsible for pro-
tecting the public purposes of the legal framework.  Although as I have ar-
gued elsewhere, there is an important truth wrapped inside this standard 
bromide,
164 this characterization does not help lawyers to distinguish  which 
public or private responsibilities attach to particular lawyering roles, nor 
how practitioners (or policymakers) should resolve the inevitable conflicts 
that arise when these two sets of responsibilities pull in different directions.  
What is needed, therefore, is a much more specific articulation of the nature 
of a lawyer‟s public and private duties in particular contexts and an exami-
   
  162.  David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good?  The Role of  Public Service in 
the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2004) (describing this 
growing separation); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 283, 297-98, 300 (1998) (noting a reduction in public service among lawyers 
and reporting that three quarters of bar members surveyed believe that lawyers are increa-
singly money conscious). 
  163.  Of course, whether the profession ever really lived up to its stated creed is de-
batable to say the least.  See Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: 
Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: 
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (arguing that not-
withstanding all of its many faults, that elite lawyers in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries did at least take seriously their commitments to public service both within and 
outside their roles as private lawyers).   
  164.  See David B. Wilkins, Partner Shamartner!  EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & 
Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1273-77 (2007) (discussing the “paradox of professional 
distinctiveness” which posits that a plausible connection to public purposes and goals is one 
of the key things that makes the legal profession distinctive and helps to preserve its autono-
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nation of the institutional incentives and constraints that either contribute to 
exacerbating the tension between these responsibilities or that might be en-
listed to reduce this tension.
165   
Thus, it is not sufficient to tell plaintiffs‟ lawyers serving as substitute 
attorneys general that they should behave as if they were government law-
yers.  Notwithstanding the fact that they have been deputized to serve as 
public officials, these lawyers nevertheless remain private practitioners sub-
ject to the incentives created by their law firms and by the private market-
place generally.  Given their position, it is not only inevitable but complete-
ly appropriate for these lawyers to care about being compensated for the 
work that they perform and their law firm‟s continuing ability to compete in 
the  marketplace.    The  question,  therefore,  is  not  whether  these  private-
public lawyers will be motivated in part by their own financial interests.  
Indeed, it is precisely the desire to harness these market-based incentives 
that have led many public actors to favor privatizing various public func-
tions in the first place.
166  Instead, the relevant question is the extent to 
which substitute counsel should be entitled to act on these motivations, and 
whether institutional and procedural mechanisms can be put in place by 
both public and private actors to keep these incentives within reasonable 
bounds.   
Overall, the kind of contract exemplified by the agreement  between 
Cohen Milstein and the state of Nevada appears to do a pretty good job of 
balancing these competing considerations.  As indicated above, the agre e-
ment gives the Attorney General the right to control all major elements of 
the litigation, including whether and on what terms the case will be settled.  
There is, however, one exception to the Attorney General‟s plenary authori-
ty in this area.  In the event of a settlement “for injunctive relief only” (or 
other terms that provide relief directly to borrowers in the form of favorable 
future terms), the contract provides that Cohen and Milstein will receive 
“costs and hourly fees at fair market value of their legal services expended 
on behalf of the State.”
167  “In such an event,” the contract continues, “the 
State agrees not to settle the case unless the defendant agrees to pay said 
amount.”
168  This provision is meant to protect Cohen and Milstein from so-
called “sacrifice” offers in which the defendant agrees to provide certain 
   
  165.  For my prior arguments in favor of a more context-specific approach to legal 
ethics, see, for example, Wilkins, supra note 8; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992); Wilkins, supra note 159.  I return to the issue of 
regulation below. 
  166.  See Minow, supra note 155, at 25-27 (discussing market based justifications for 
privatization). 
  167.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, § 3.5.4. 
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injunctive relief in return for the plaintiff agreeing to waive any claim for 
attorney‟s fees.
169   
In Evans v. Jeff D., the Supreme Court approved the defendant‟s use 
of such offers over the strenuous objection of many members of the public 
interest bar who claimed that allowing defendants to demand fee waivers 
would diminish the enforcement of the civil rights laws.
170  In reaching this 
conclusion, however, the court endorsed the negotiability of fee waivers 
more generally, suggesting that there was nothing to prevent lawyers from 
entering into agreements with their clients to refuse such offers  ex ante, or 
to provide that accepting such a settlement would trigger an obligation by 
the plaintiff to pay the lawyer from other sources.
171  Consequently, Cohen 
Milstein would arguably be entitled to  insist on inserting a provision pr e-
venting a fee waiver in its retainer agreement with one of its private clients.  
In the context of this kind of public representation, however, this kind of 
contract provision can legitimately be seen as a restriction on  the state‟s 
plenary power to settle the case without respect to Cohen Milstein‟s inter-
ests.   
The fact that the State of Nevada has agreed not to accept a pure sacri-
fice offer to settle the case, however, does not mean that the Attorney Gen-
eral has exceeded her authority in agreeing to this term.  To be sure, if the 
state were represented solely by public lawyers, it would be able to settle 
the case on any terms the Attorney General saw fit, including terms that 
precluded the state from seeking payment for its attorneys fees.  But the 
state has chosen to seek the benefit of engaging private lawyers to help it 
pursue its claim.  As private practitioners, Cohen Milstein cannot stay in 
business unless it is paid for its work.  While the firm might decide to do-
nate its services to the state pro bono, it is not required to do so.  It therefore 
should have the right to protect itself against opportunism by both defen-
dants and state officials in crafting a settlement that essentially forces the 
firm to donate its services, even if the practical effect of this provision is to 
make it more difficult to settle the case.  Although many would argue that 
preventing settlements conditioned on fee waivers promotes the public in-
   
  169.  2  MARTIN  A.  SCHWARTZ  &  JOHN  E.  KIRKLIN,  SECTION  1983  LITIGATION: 
STATUTORY ATTORNEYS FEES 441 (Aspen Law & Business 3d ed. 1997) (defining a sacrifice 
offer as an offer in which “the defendant expressly conditions the granting of substantial 
relief, often of an equitable nature, on the plaintiff‟s waiver or severe compromise of the 
right to statutory attorney‟s fees on which plaintiff‟s counsel is wholly or partly relying for 
the payment of his fee”). 
  170.  See 475 U.S. 717, 730-38 (1986). 
  171.  Id.; see also Moore v. Nat‟l Assn. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F. 2d 1093, 1105 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (specifically noting that “carefully drafted retainer agreements” between 
plaintiffs and  their  attorneys  could  “minimize  the  potential  conflicts”  between  plaintiffs‟ 
attorneys and their clients with  respect to possible fee  waivers resulting from settlement 
negotiations with defendants).  464  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
terest,
172 even if it is only in the narrow econo mic self-interest of Cohen 
Milstein the firm should nevertheless be entitled to insist that it will only go 
forward with the representation if the state agrees to forgo this potentially 
beneficial option.
173  If the Attorney General believes that this is too  much 
of an imposition on the public interest, he or she can always try to find 
another private firm that will not insist on this provision, or prosecute the 
action with public attorneys over whom the state can exercise plenary co n-
trol. 
By the same token,  the public lawyers working with Cohen Mi lstein 
ought to be entitled to insist on certain restrictions on conduct within the 
firm that in the private context would be considered perfectly appropriate in 
order to preserve the state‟s legitimate public interest in the representation.  
The contract between the state and the firm indeed does provide many such 
restrictions.  As indicated above, the contract lays out in great detail Cohen 
Milstein‟s obligation to litigate the case in a manner that allows the Attor-
ney General to ensure that the public‟s interest is protected—as the Attorney 
General defines these goals.
174  The agreement also requires the firm to ad-
here to restrictions regarding conflicts of interest that arguably go beyond 
what would be required in the private context.  Thus, Cohen Milstein must 
“advise the Attorney General of any perceived conflict . . . throughout the 
performance of this Contract” and is prevented from “engage[ing] in private 
litigation against the State at the same time [that the firm] accepts appoint-
ments representing the State” pursuant to the contract without the govern-
ment‟s express consent.
175  Finally, Cohen Milstein agrees that its “books, 
records, documents and accounting procedures” relevant to the firm‟s per-
formance under the contract “shall be subject to inspection, examination and 
audit by the State.”
176  
   
  172.  See generally Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the 
Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. Jeff D.: A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights 
Attorney‟s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553 (1987) (arguing that Evans was 
inconsistent with the spirit of the fees act). 
  173.  Given that the firm would have done nothing wrong in a situation where the 
defendant  makes  a  “sacrifice”  offer—and  will  have  procured  injunctive  or  other  non-
monetary relief for the state this kind of provision is qualitatively different from ones that 
attempt to restrict the state‟s plenary right to control the case by requiring that substitute 
counsel be paid a large percentage of any future recovery even after it has been dismissed for 
cause or that require outside counsels‟ approval before the Attorney General can accept a 
monetary settlement.  See DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO, supra note 125, at 6-7 (reporting courts that 
have questioned these provisions).   
  174.  Once again, whether this is really protecting the public interest is a function of 
the Attorney General‟s political motivations—and the ability of other state officials and the 
public at large to check these incentives. 
  175.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, §§ 16.1, 16.2. 
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These restrictions, however, should arguably extend beyond the four 
corners of the representation itself.  Concurrent conflicts, in which a law 
firm like Cohen Milstein is simultaneously representing a client with inter-
ests opposed to the state at the same time it is acting as substitute attorney 
general, are only one of the potential risks to the public interest in these 
cases.  As the TARP example underscores, there is also the danger that pri-
vate firms in this role will be influenced by their past client relationships, or 
the possibility of representing clients in the future.  Although the Model 
Rules of Professional Responsibility applicable to all lawyers provide some 
protection against these kind of former (or future) client conflicts,
177 the fact 
that substitute attorneys general are also discharging public responsibilities 
counsels in favor of state officials requiring firms like Cohen Milstein to 
disclose past client relationships that have been adverse to the state as well 
as those that are currently ongoing.
178 
Indeed, once we acknowledge that defendants are also part of the 
“public” that both the public and private lawyers in these cases are obligated 
to protect, it is clear that contractual provisions requiring firms like Cohen 
Milstein to make certain representations and disclosures to state officials 
may not be enough to protect these third parties‟ interests.  To address these 
concerns, we must move beyond the realm of private contracting to examine 
how public law can help to ensure a proper balance between public and pri-
vate responsibilities in cases of this kind. 
At a minimum, the “pay-to-play” risks associated with private lawyers 
vying for potentially lucrative appointments as substitute attorneys general 
underscores the need for both state and federal authorities to ensure that 
such engagements are subject to statutes or regulations requiring transpa-
rency and open procedures.  Similarly, to the extent that these private law-
yers are being deputized to operate as if they are officers of the state, they 
should be subject to the public regulations that govern the conduct of public 
employees. 
Consider, once again, the conflict rules.  The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility have always contained special rules regulating con-
flicts of interest for government lawyers.
179  These rules restrict the ability of 
former government lawyers to represent private clients in matters in which 
   
  177.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (a)(2) (2009) (prohibiting lawyers 
from representing clients where there is a significant risk that their judgment will be com-
promised by their representation of a former client or by the interests of a third person or by 
the personal interests of the lawyer); see also MODEL RULES  OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.9 
(relating to conflicts involving former clients). 
  178.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, § 16.2 (requiring disclosure of “all litigation, 
claims and maters in which Contractor represents parties adverse to the State”) (emphasis 
added).  
  179.  MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (entitled “Special Conflicts of Inter-
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the lawyer “participated personally and substantially as a public officer or 
employee” and restrict current government attorneys from “participat[ing] 
in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially 
while in private practice.”
180  As the comment to the Rule states, these pro-
visions are designed not only to protect the interests of former clients but 
also “to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of 
another  client.”
181  As  indicated  above,  one  of  the  risks  associated  with 
bringing in private lawyers to act as substitute attorneys general is that they 
will use this position to further the interests of other past, present, or future 
clients—either by subsequently bringing “coattail litigation” against similar 
defendants in cases like the Tobacco Litigation, or in the TARP area, by 
steering government policy in favor of financial institutions that may have 
been former clients (or which may one day be future clients).  Yet it is not 
clear that the law firms engaged as substitute attorneys general in these cas-
es are covered by these restrictions.  The agreement between Cohen Mils-
tein and the State of Nevada, for example, expressly provides that the firm 
is being hired as an “independent contractor” and “shall not be deemed of-
ficers, agents or employees of the State of Nevada.”
182  Given that these 
firms are supposed to act as if they are simply just another public lawyer for 
the state, however, it is hard to see why the legal distinction between an 
“officer or employee” on the one hand and an “independent contractor” on 
the other should exempt them from these regulatory prohibitions.
183   
Indeed, one can make an argument that the special dangers inherent in 
this kind of representation counsel in favor of providing more protection to 
affected third parties than is  currently provided in Model Rule 1.11.  As 
currently drafted, the Rule allows a former government lawyer to represent 
a private client in a case in which he or she participated personally and sub-
stantially while in government—or a current government lawyer to partici-
pate in a matter in which he or she had the same kind of involvement on 
behalf of a former client while in private practice—so long as “the appro-
priate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writ-
ing.”
184  Although this requirement arguably protects the government‟s in-
   
  180.  Id. R. 1.11(a)(2), (d)(2)(i). 
  181.  Id. R. 1.11 cmt. 3. 
  182.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, § 20.  As indicated above, the lawyers who are 
hired  under  the  TARP  program  are  similarly  treated  as  “contractors”  and  not  “financial 
agents.”  See Clark, What Treasury Got Right, supra note 155. 
  183.  Kathleen Clark makes a similar argument with respect to independent contrac-
tors performing government functions generally.   See Clark, supra note 11 (arguing that 
independent contractors should be subject to the same restrictions on conflicts of interest as 
government employees). 
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terest,
185 it may not be sufficient to protect the interest of private parties who 
may also be affected by whether these substitute attorneys general are prop-
erly weighing their public and private responsibilities, b oth while acting in 
this capacity and after they return to private practice.  To be sure, there are 
certainly valid reasons for not requiring all such affected parties to give 
their express consent in every case where a lawyer is moving from gover n-
ment to private practice or vice versa.  It does, however, make sense to r e-
quire  government officials to disclose publicly in such cases that they have 
given their consent, along with a description of whatever s afeguards have 
been put in place, so that private parties can challenge whether the decision 
is consistent with a broad understanding of the public inte rest that includes 
their interests as well. 
A similar analysis should apply to the restrictions regarding the use of 
confidential information that a substit ute attorney general learns in the 
course of her representation.  The contract between Cohen Milstein and the 
State of Nevada expressly recognizes the danger that the firm‟s acquisition 
of this kind of information can pose for third parties.  Thus, the firm is re-
quired to use any “confidential business information” that it learns in the 
course of the representation “only for the purposes of carrying out the work 
required by the Contract” and may not disclose the information “to anyone 
other than properly cleared employees” and must return all such information 
to the Attorney General “whenever the information is no longer required . . . 
for performance of the work . . . or upon completion/termination of the Con-
tract.”
186  These restrictions, however, are not nearly as protective of the 
interests of third parties as those provided for in Model Rule 1.11 with re-
spect to government officers or employees.  That Rule flatly provides that  
a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government in-
formation about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or em-
ployee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person 
in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of 
that person.
187   
   
  185.  Congress appears to have reached a different conclusion.  Unlike the Model 
Rules, federal law prohibits federal agencies from consenting to such representation, at least 
in circumstances where the former government lawyer would make an appearance in federal 
court or communicate with the government on behalf of a client.  See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a).  I 
am grateful to Kathleen Clark for bringing this statute to my attention. 
  186.  Fee Agreement, supra note 87, §§17-3. 
  187.  MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.1(c).  The Rule goes on to define “con-
fidential government information” as “information that has been obtained under governmen-
tal authority and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law 
from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not other-
wise available to the public.”  Id.  It is likely that a significant amount of the information that 
private lawyers acting as substitute attorneys general learn during the course of litigation 
against private clients would fit this definition.   468  Michigan State Law Review  [Vol. 2010:423 
The Rule goes on to provide that other lawyers in the firm may only handle 
such a matter if “the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any partic-
ipation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.”
188  
Once again, given that substitute attorneys general are supposed to be indis-
tinguishable from their public counterparts, there seems little reason to ex-
empt  them  from  these  requirements  simply  because  they  are  technically 
independent contractors and not government officers or employees. 
Indeed, here too one might argue that the rules should go even further 
in this context to ensure that affected private parties receive notice and an 
opportunity to be heard to protect their interests.  In a move that itself high-
lights the shrinking distance between public and private lawyers, the Model 
Rules were recently amended to allow law firms hiring lawyers moving 
from one private law firm to another to engage in the kind of screening that 
previously had only been permitted when lawyers moved from government 
employment to the private sector.
189  In order to ensure that former clients 
are able to protect their interests in these circumstances, the Rule requires 
that any firm seeking to set up such a screen provide written notice to “any 
affected former client,” including “a description of the screening procedures 
employed;  a  statement  of  the  firm‟s  and  of  the  screened  lawyer‟s  com-
pliance with these Rules; a statement that review may be available before a 
tribunal; and an agreement by the firm to respond promptly to any written 
inquiries or objections” as well as periodic certifications during and after the 
case.
190  Although these requirements only apply to “former clients,” a simi-
lar set of disclosure and reporting obligations to inform parties who may be 
affected by the screening of a lawyer who is or has acted as a substitute at-
torney general in a matter in which that attorney has learned confidential 
information that may be relevant to a matter being litigated by other lawyers 
in the firm would serve similar purposes. 
Although there are, therefore, persuasive arguments for holding substi-
tute attorneys general to the same rules regarding conflicts of interest that 
apply to government lawyers in general, and perhaps in some circumstances 
rules that are even more stringent, these same rules caution against making 
these restrictions so stringent that they discourage lawyers from serving in 
this role.  As the Comment to Model Rule 1.11 makes clear, “the rules go-
verning lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency 
should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from 
the government.”
191  This is particularly important in this context since not-
   
  188.  Id. R. 1.11(b). 
  189.  Id. R. 1.10(a)(2). 
  190.  Id. 
  191.  Id. R. 1.11, cmt. 4.  Cf. Clark, supra note 10, at 1065-66 (noting that “[b]ecause 
the lawyer-client relationship is different [in the public context], the state attorney general is 
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withstanding their duty to act as if they are just another lawyer for the state, 
substitute attorneys general remain, as I have argued above, private lawyers 
who are entitled to respond to the incentives of the private marketplace.  
Moreover, as the description of the differences between Motley Rice and 
Cohen  Milstein  outlined  above  underscore, there  are  benefits  as  well  as 
risks associated with having former government lawyers engaged in this 
kind of public-private representation.  This brings us to the third and final 
factor that should shape our understanding of how to balance these two in-
creasingly intertwined but nevertheless conflicting aspects of the lawyer‟s 
role: mobility. 
As I indicated at the outset of this Essay, a growing number of lawyers 
are building careers that move between the public and the private sector.  
Indeed, even the Eternal General Frank Kelley returned to the private sector 
after completing his thirty-seven years in office, building one of the most 
successful lobbying firms in the state.
192  This revolving door clearly creates 
risks, in the language quoted above from the Model Rules, that lawyers will 
“exploit” the benefits of public office for the advantages of private clients.  
But it also creates a cadre of private lawyers who understand the benefits of 
public service, and public lawyers who know what it is like to be on the 
receiving end of public power.  To be sure, there is no guarantee that these 
lessons will be used to bring these two domains closer together.  But just as 
those who support mandatory pro bono programs and other forms of public 
service in law school have argued that being socialized into the culture of 
public service at an early age will affect the way that this new generation of 
lawyers  understand and act on the public dimensions of their roles as pri-
vate practitioners, there is at least the possibility that spending time in mul-
tiple areas of practice will give those who do so a greater appreciation of the 
legitimate (and illegitimate) interests and concerns of, for example, public 
officials even as they represent private clients.
193  Reports about the culture 
and standards of the community of former Assistant United States Attorneys 
who have moved into private practice suggest that in at least some circums-
tances these hopes can be realized.
194  The fact that firms such as C ohen 
   
permitted to do things that conflict-of-interest standards would normally prohibit” such as 
representing two state agencies opposing each other in a law suit). 
  192.  See KELLEY CAWTHORNE, http://www.kelley-cawthorne.com/index.html (report-
ing that Mr. Kelley founded the firm in 1999 and that it has “quickly distinguished itself by 
being named as one of the state‟s top five (5) most effective lobbying organizations”). 
  193.  See Robert Granfield & Philip Veliz, Good Lawyering and Lawyering for the 
Good: Lawyers‟ Reflections on Mandatory Pro Bono in Law School, in PRIVATE LAWYERS & 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE  OF PRO BONO 53 (Robert Granfield &  Lynn 
Mather, eds. 2009) (making this argument). 
  194.  I and others have written generally about the unique culture and community of 
former AUSAs in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 162, at 43-44 (refer-
ring to the “„former assistant‟s club‟ of ex-AUSAs” in private practice that helped AUSA 
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Milstein are developing government-representation practices that are largely 
staffed by former government lawyers, therefore, should be taken as a hope-
ful sign. 
Needless to say, it remains to be seen whether any of these three strat-
egies—educating lawyers about the need to consider and address the specif-
ic tensions created by the tug of public and private considerations in particu-
lar lawyering contexts, crafting ethical and regulatory policies that seek to 
shape and constrain these tensions, or encouraging professional socializa-
tion that takes advantage of the growing movement of lawyers between pub-
lic and private settings—will create a new and workable way of conceptua-
lizing and managing the public-private distinction in legal ethics.  What is 
certain is that we are unlikely to make progress unless we find a way of 
talking about this issue that goes beyond both the traditional model‟s as-
sumption that there is in fact no tension between these two roles and the 
more recent tendency to talk as if these two domains are irreconcilable and 
mutually exclusive.  The growing use of substitute attorneys general at both 
the state and federal levels and the complex issues this practice poses for 
both  governments  and  private  parties  underscores  that  we  delay  moving 
beyond these standard hobby horses at our peril. 
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